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# THE BATTLE OF MEGIDDO

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY  
OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND LITERATURE  
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF ORIENTAL LANGUAGES AND LITERATURES

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BY


HAROLD HAYDEN NELSON

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






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VIEW VI.—General panorama of the battlefield taken from Knoll F looking northwest

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
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## PREFACE

The text of this study was prepared and printed before the war, but owing to the fact that I was confined behind the Turkish lines in Syria during the whole of the war, it was impossible to secure the cuts of the illustrations and maps till some time after the conclusion of hostilities. Meanwhile the photographs had suffered from the lapse of time and an effort to secure new ones in the summer of 1920 failed owing to the stupidity of certain Syrian auto-drivers. But the photographs, such as they are, will nevertheless serve to illustrate the text.

Had the University of Chicago regulations governing the publication of theses permitted, I would gladly have rewritten the whole manuscript in the light of the recent campaign of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force under Lord Allenby in the same region in which Thutmose III, nearly 3,500 years earlier, also defeated an enemy advancing from the north toward Egypt. There are certain interesting and striking parallels and contrasts between the strategy of the earliest and of the latest victorious commanders of campaigns in central Palestine.

This study is confined almost entirely to an effort to interpret the Annals of Thutmose III in the light of the geography of the environs of Megiddo. I have entered into no philological discussion, although such points were thoroughly considered in preparation of the translation of the Annals. I regret that I am unable to incorporate certain material bearing on the subject of this study which has appeared since the text was printed in Beirut, Syria, in 1913, and also that I cannot make use of certain valuable suggestions made by those who campaigned in Palestine in 1917-18. A number of typographical errors have crept into the text which were unavoidable under the circumstances in which it was printed.

HAROLD H. NELSON

EXCHANGE

## THE BATTLE OF MEGIDDO

### INTRODUCTION

The Battle of Megiddo on May 15th, 1479 B.C. between the Egyptians under Thutmose III and the allied forces of the Syrian states is the first battle in history which we can study in any detail. Most of the ancient oriental accounts of battles are mere statements of the forces engaged and of the outcome of the conflicts. Among the Egyptian records, however, there are preserved in considerable detail the narratives of two or three engagements from which we can gather, with greater or less clearness, the general plan of each battle, the disposition of the troops and the manœuvres of the opposing armies.<sup>1</sup> So far these battles have been studied either without reference to the topography of the battlefields, or with insufficient data regarding the physical features of the area of operations and the bearing they must have had on the course of the engagement. In the following discussion of the Battle of Megiddo it has been my endeavor to interpret the scanty records of the conflict preserved in hieroglyphic in the light of the topography of the region, which I studied on two visits to the battlefield in the summers of 1909 and 1912. On those two occasions I made a series of surveys and took a number of photographs which are here reproduced. They include a sufficient number of views to bear out my observations on the topography which are contained in the text of this discussion. I have used as the basis of my plan of the battlefield the excellent map in Schumacher's Tell el-Mutesellim, Band II, adding myself certain details not found on the original, especially the configuration of the hills to the west and

<sup>1</sup> Besides the Battle of Megiddo, compare, for the Battle of Kadesh, Breasted, *Battle of Kadesh*, and for the siege of Memphis by Piankhi see Breasted, *Ancient Records*, IV, 857-865.

south of Megiddo, and verifying most of the altitudes found on Schumacher's map. In this connection I wish to thank for their assistance my colleagues, Dr. Harvey Porter, of Beirût, Syria, who visited Megiddo with me in 1909, and especially Professor Alfred H. Joy, also of Beirût, who was with me in 1912, without whose assistance my work would have been attended with great difficulty and delay.

In the introduction to his "Antike Schlachtfelder in Griechenland" Kromayer says:

"Wenn es in der modernen Kriegsgeschichte von je her als unerlässliche Voraussetzung für die Erkenntnis gegolten hat, dass den Schilderungen der Feldzüge und Schlachten Karten und Pläne beigelegt seien, so muss man sich wundern, dass man bei der Behandlung antiker Schlachten so lange Zeit geglaubt hat, dieses Hilfsmittel entbehren und auch ohne dasselbe zu einem leidlichen Verständnisse kommen zu können.

"Es braucht ja vor Leuten, die auch nur ein ganz klein wenig mit den Bedingungen dieses Studiums bekannt sind, eigentlich gar nicht mehr ausgesprochen zu werden, dass selbst die genaueste und lebendigste Schilderung solcher Ereignisse für sich allein tot und unanschaulich bleibt, dass ein Blick auf eine gute Karte mehr gibt als stundenlanges Studium oft nur irrtumveranlassender Beschreibungen."

I have quoted at such length from Kromayer on account of the importance, as it seems to me, of his position on the study of military history in its application to oriental military movements, a position which cannot be too much emphasized and which, if adopted by some oriental historians, would have prevented many of the impossibilities in the interpretation of ancient historical inscriptions which are now found in some of the current histories. It has been my effort in the following study to take Kromayer's position throughout. I have consulted the discussions of the battle contained in the chief histories, those of Breasted, Brugsch, Budge, Hall, Maspero, Meyer, Petrie and Wiedemann, and have also made use of Schumacher's topographical and archæological studies in MuNDPV and in his Tell-el-Mutesellim. The chronology of the campaign is that of Breasted, as presented in his Ancient Records, II, 409, which is based on his studies in AZ, 37, 123 ff. and 39, 60-68. For a bibliography of the older publications of the hieroglyphic sources the reader is referred to Breasted's Ancient Records, II, 391, note a. The present study is based on the text of the Annals of Thutmose III in Sethe's Urkunden der 18. Dynastie, pp. 647-667, with a few changes and omissions where Sethe's text is entirely a restoration by the editor. I have

also taken into account such other references to the battle as may be found in the Eighteenth Dynasty inscriptions, all of which are published in Sethe's Urkunden.

At this point I wish to acknowledge my great indebtedness to Professor Breasted, from whom I have received constant encouragement and continued and most valuable suggestions. Any acknowledgment of the help and inspiration derived from his stimulating teaching is, at best, inadequate. Since the appearance of his Ancient Records any one who attempts to deal with historical subjects in the Egyptian field must consciously or unconsciously appropriate much from that valuable mine of information. Though the translation of the Annals appearing in the Records is based on an inferior text to the one I have been able to use (as the Urkunden did not appear till after the Records were already out), nevertheless I have drawn much assistance from Dr. Breasted's translation, in some cases even adopting his very words where I felt there was no reason for changing them. Many of the variations from his translation Dr. Breasted would himself incorporate in substance into a new edition of the Records.

I wish also to thank my colleague in Professor Breasted's seminar, Mr. George Allen, who has made several helpful suggestions on doubtful passages in the text.

## I

## THE TOPOGRAPHY OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

## THE ANNALS, LINES 6-13

Urk. 647 Year 22, month four of the second season, day 25; [his Majesty was in the fortress of]<sup>2</sup> (7) Tharu on the first victorious campaign [to repulse the invaders]<sup>3</sup> (8) of the boundaries of Urk. 648 Egypt, in valor, [in victory, in might, in triumph.]

(9) Now it was a [long] time [that they ruled this land which was in] (10) disturbance. Every man was working for [their princes who were in Avaris.] (11) It came to pass at a later time that the garrison which had been there (12) were in the city of Sharuhen.

They were from Yeraza (13) to the Marshes of the Earth<sup>4</sup>

2. Sethe would read "his Majesty passed by the fortress of." However, the usual restoration, as I have given it, seems to fill the lacuna as well and agrees with the formula usual throughout the Annals. For the restoration cf. Rougé, *Inscr. hier.* 207.

3. Sethe, "Neue Spuren der Hyksos in Inschriften der 18. Dynastie," *ÄZ*, p. 73 ff, supports this restoration of the Urkunden, but the use of the rare word *ikkw*, "invaders", seems too definite to be accepted.

4. Sethe, *op. cit.*, p. 84, translates the passage "von Jrd bis zu den Enden der Erde". This phrase, "From Yeraza to the Marshes of the Earth," Breasted, *Ancient Records*, II, 416, note d, interprets as meaning "from northwestern Judea to beyond the Euphrates." This also seems to be the meaning given by Müller, *A. und E.*, p. 281 ff. Maspero, *Recueil*, II, p. 50, translates the passage "à partir de la ville de Yeraza, jusqu'aux régions lointaines de la terre". On the other hand, Hall, *Anc. Hist. of the Near East*, p. 234, note 1, says, "This does not mean the country from Northwestern Judea to beyond the Euphrates, as Breasted thinks, but to the Serbonian bog and Lake Menzala." That the term, "Marshes of the Earth", was originally applied to the marshes of the Delta is most likely and thus it came to signify the extreme north as known to the Egyptian of the prehistoric period. As, however, the Egyptian frontier was pushed over into Asia and geographical knowledge extended, the old term came to be applied to the Naharin region, which was then the northern limit of Egyptian geography. Hall, on page 234, translates the passage under discussion, "from Yeraza to the marshes of Egypt", in which he renders *t* as "Egypt", a rather unjustifiable liberty with the meaning of the word which prejudices the question. That the term "marshes" would apply aptly to the plains of northern Syria, at least in the rainy winter and early summer, is evident to any traveller who has tried to make his way across the wide stretches of flooded land around Aleppo at that time of year. "The Marshes of Asia" are constantly referred to in the historical inscriptions; see *Ancient Records*, II, 120, 321, 385, 402; III, 118. Again, "the Marshes of Naharin" occurs in *Ancient Records*, II, 631, and III, 118. "Marshes" is synonymous with Mitanni in *Ancient Records*, II, 659. In *Ancient Records*, III, 480 we have re-



when they began to<sup>5</sup> revolt against his Majesty.<sup>6</sup>

Year 23, first month of the third season, day 4; day of the feast of the royal coronation; (14) at the city of "Which-the-prince-seized", Gaza [is its name in Kharu.]<sup>7</sup>

[Year 23,] (15) first month of the third season, day 5; departure from this place in valor, [in victory,] (16) in might, in triumph, to overthrow that wretched foe and to extend (17) Urk. 649 the boundaries of Egypt, according to that which his father, Amon, commanded.....(18) he seize.

Year 23, first month of the third season, day 16; at the city of Yehem.

When Thutmose III at last became sole ruler of Egypt after the death of his queen Hatshepsut, about 1480 B.C., he found himself confronted with a dangerous situation in his Asiatic provinces. The remnants of the Hyksos power, driven from Egypt a hundred years earlier by Ahmose I, and since brought into subjection to Egypt by Amenhotep I and Thutmose I, had taken advantage of the military inactivity of Hatshepsut's supremacy to combine for a last struggle with the expanding power of Egypt.<sup>8</sup> The center of the movement seems to have been the King of Kadesh on the Orontes. Under his leadership the dynasts of Syria-Palestine united and their combined forces advanced

ference made to the "marshlands" (plu) as being the extreme limit of the world, therefore not of Egypt. Again in *Ancient Records*, II, 101, 657; III, 434, "Marshes" is clearly used to refer to countries remote from Egypt in northern Syria. It is strange if in this passage alone among historical inscriptions "the Marshes of the Earth" (not "Egypt") should be used of Egypt, especially when the writer is speaking of a revolt, the center of which was in the north at Kadesh, and the members of which included "every chief of every northern country." (*Urk.* IV, 660, 7).

5. The idiom  $\omega^4 r$  in this passage is of uncertain meaning. Breasted, *PSBA*, 23, 239 ff., suggests the translation "to be about to, to begin". The latest discussion, that in Gardiner, *Admonitions*, p. 53, suggests that the "notion of a logical development in a wrong direction, is present in a greater or less degree". In *Sitzung der K. P. Akademie*, XXXIX, p. 51, Erman gives the meaning as "sich anschicken zu", on the basis of the Berlin Dictionary material. None of these explanation seems to entirely fit all the cases. I have adopted Erman's rendition as nearly as possible, adapting the idea to the exigencies of translation where necessary.

6. The translation as given above is based on Sethe's reconstruction, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-86. The restoration of such words as "Avaris", however, is altogether too daring to serve as a basis for scientific conclusions. As it does not prejudice in any way the results of the present study, I give the passage in full.

7. So Sethe. Equals "is its Palestinian name" - a very doubtful restoration.

8. For the latest evidence of the identity of the Asiatic opponents of Thutmose III with the Hyksos, see Sethe's reconstruction of the text of the Annals, *op. cit.*

southward to the Plain of Esdrælon to meet the advance of Thutmose III who was bent on bringing the rebellious states again under Egyptian control. In the 22nd year of his reign, on the 25th day of the 8th month (April 19th, 1479 B.C.), Thutmose marched out of Egypt at the frontier fortress of Tharu<sup>9</sup> on his eastern border and lead his army towards Palestine. Just how large his forces were it is impossible to say, though we may be certain that they comprised not more than 15,000 to 20,000 men, while 10,000 would probably not be underestimating their numbers.<sup>10</sup> The Asiatics certainly did not outnumber the Egyptians, and we may therefore place the contending forces at between 10,000 and 15,000 men each. Of these a portion was chariotry and the remainder infantry, armed for the most part with bows and spears. The sword was as yet almost, if not entirely, unknown in oriental warfare, probably not coming into use in the East till the introduction of Sherden mercenaries, who first appear under Amenhotep III.<sup>11</sup> Each chariot held two men, the driver and an archer. The Hittites later were accustomed to use three men to a chariot, but we have no evidence that the Asiatics at this time used more than two men. The effectiveness of the chariot depended on the skill of the archer and on the demoralization wrought among the enemy by the charge of the chariots into their ranks.

On the 4th day of the 9th month (April 28th), Thutmose was in Gaza, the first important place he met in Palestine.<sup>12</sup> On the 16th of the month (May 19th) he reached Yehem, where he seems to have come into touch with the enemy for the first time. Just where this city lay is open to question. It must have been located on the coast plain near the southern slope of the Carmel Ridge, for, first, it was at or near the junction of three roads that led across the Ridge into the Plain of Esdrælon, and the only three roads that thus cross the Ridge meet on the coast plain at the foot of the Ridge not far from Tell el-Asâwir (see Map I); and, second, it lay so near the Ridge that when the army marched out of

<sup>9</sup> For location of Tharu see Kùthmann, *Die Ostgrenze Aegyptens*, pp. 33-46.

<sup>10</sup> For a discussion of the available material on the size of Egyptian armies see Breasted, *Battle of Kadesh*, pp. 8-11.

<sup>11</sup> Knudtzon, *El-Amarna Tafeln*, 122.

<sup>12</sup> On the importance of Gaza and its neighborhood from a military standpoint see Olmstead, *Sargon of Assyria*, p. 62 ff. Also Hartmann "Die Strasse Von Damaskus nach Kairo", *ZDMG*, 64, p. 668.

Yeḥem on May 13th, the troops had already assumed the peculiar formation necessitated by the mountain defile,<sup>13</sup> but which would have been entirely unnecessary on the open coast plain. Near the spot where the three roads meet is located the modern village of Yemma, which Petrie has identified with Thutmose's halting place.<sup>14</sup> Although the identification is little more than guesswork, still Yeḥem must have lain in the neighborhood of Yemma, and may be provisionally located near that spot.

Any army approaching Syria from the south along the coast road encounters just beyond Yeḥem the first natural barrier to its advance. The ridge of hills, shooting off from the highlands of Ephraim, running from southeast to northwest and terminating at the seaward end in Mt. Carmel, cuts through the coast plain and offers a natural bulwark of defence to southern Syria.<sup>15</sup> The Ridge, stretching out for eighteen or nineteen miles, runs along the southern edge of the Plain of Esdrælon. It is crossed in two places by roads which apparently have, since the beginning of history, serves as highways of commerce for the caravans passing back and forth from Egypt to Mesopotamia. The Ridge itself falls naturally into two parts, the northern section, which forms Mt. Carmel, and the southern end, known first as Belâd er-Ruḥah and further south as Umm el-Khaṭaf and Umm el-Faḥm.<sup>16</sup> The sides of Mt. Carmel itself rise so steeply from the plain, especially on the north, that nothing but the roughest and steepest footpath can cross it. At its highest point it attains an altitude of 1,800 feet, while at its southern extremity, just above the road from Tell Kaimûn to Tell el-Asâwir, it is still some 1,000 feet above the sea. No hostile army, nor indeed peaceful caravan, can climb its rocky eastern side. In order to reach the north of Carmel, an army approaching from the south must either go around

13. *Urk.*, IV, 652.

14. *Hist. of Egypt*, II, p. 327. Cf. Müller, *MVAG*, 1907, I, p. 22. Maspero, *Struggle of the Nations*, p. 257, note 1, puts Yeḥem at el-Kheimeh (following F. de Saulcy). Hall, *Anc. Hist. of the Near East*, p. 235, suggests that the town probably lay in the present Wady Yahmur, a small wady in the low hills south of 'Ar'arah.

15. The following description of this region is drawn from my own notes, as well as from the numerous accounts of this district which have been published by travellers.

16. For lack of any other designation I shall speak of this whole range of hills, including Carmel, Belâd er-Ruḥah, Umm el-Faḥm and Umm el-Khaṭaf, as the Carmel Ridge, distinguishing it thus from Mt. Carmel proper, which forms its northern end.

the northern end by the site of the modern city of Haifa on the sea, the road usually followed by the crusading and other armies coming along the coast plain, or must pass around the southern end either by the road already referred to, running from Tell el-Asâwir to Tell Kaimûn, or by the road through Subbarîn and down the Wady Milḥ to Tell Kaimûn.

The remaining two-thirds of the Ridge keeps along at a moderate height of from 800 to 1,500 feet above the sea level. As seen from across the Plain of Esdrælon, the northern section of the Ridge, known as Belâd er-Rûḥah, between Carmel proper and Umm el-Faḥm, is remarkably even in height, and is lower than either extremity of the Ridge. The two roads, to which I later refer as the *first road* and the *third road*, cross the Ridge at either end of this middle section. The northern side, which abuts directly upon the Plain of Esdrælon, is fairly steep and rocky and to-day is almost totally devoid of verdure. To the traveller following the road from Haifa to Jenîn along the northern base of the hills this Ridge presents a most inhospitable and forbidding appearance. There are to-day only a very few scantily populated villages between the seaward end of the plain and Tell el-Mutesellim. The inhabitants of these villages draw their livelihood from the cultivation of the plain, and there are no signs of vineyards and groves on the hills themselves. This portion of the Ridge repels any advance of population from the plain, while its desolate appearance seems to accentuate the difficulty of crossing it presented by its barren, rocky slopes.

Between Tell el-Mutesellim and Jenîn the hills assume a more pleasing aspect and several fairly prosperous villages are scattered along their base. But these villages also turn rather towards the plain than towards the hills, which here rise to a considerable height in the region of Umm el-Khaṭaf and Umm el-Faḥm.

The southern slope is, for the most part, much more gradual, rising gently out of the coast plain, and is covered with a fair growth of trees, the evident remains of much more extensive forests. The watershed lies well to the north side of the Ridge, so that, while this line of hills seems to offer an obstacle to an enemy approaching it from the north, it, on the other hand, rises so gradually from the plain on the south that, to a vigorous commander approaching from that direction, it might seem to present but little impediment to an advance. While several hostile

armies have crossed the Ridge from south to north,<sup>17</sup> few, if any, have assayed it from north to south. Those invaders from the north who have not taken the coast road around the northern end of Carmel, have avoided the dangers of the narrow passes by following the more open and less difficult road around the southern end by Jenîn, through the Plain of 'Arrâbeh to Bâqa or Zeita.

To cross the Ridge two roads start from Tell el-Asâwir.<sup>18</sup> The one runs almost due north to Tell Kaimûn, while the second, starting slightly northeast, bifurcates at 'Ain 'Ârah, one branch reaching the Plain of Esdrælon at Tell el-Aghbariyeh, and the second branch at Tell el-Mutesellim. For convenience of designation and to avoid confusion I shall speak of these roads as the *first roads* (Tell Kaimûn to Tell el-Asâwir), the *second road* (Tell el-Aghbariyeh to 'Ain 'Ârah), the *third road* (Tell el-Mutesellim to Tell el-Asâwir), and the *fourth road* (Jenîn, the Plain of 'Arrâbeh to Bâqa or Zeita). There are one or two rough paths that cross at other places, serving to connect the various villages scattered along the Ridge, but none of them shows evidence of ever having been an ancient highway, nor would they offer an opportunity for an army to cross the hills. A study of Map I will show that these four roads occupy the only passes over the Ridge, so that, in ancient as in modern times, they served as the only regular lines of communication between the coast plain and the Plain of Esdrælon.

The *first road*, though fairly easy of ascent on the southern slope of the Ridge, is yet steep at the northern extremity. It does not connect at the northern end with any highway to the northeast, but leads rather into the Phœnician Plain than into the Plain of Esdrælon.<sup>19</sup>

For the moment I shall pass over the *second road*, which debouches into the great plain at Tell el-Aghbariyeh, and shall consider in some de-

17. These include Thutmose III, Pharaoh Necho, and Napoleon. It is interesting, however, that Napoleon in his retreat kept to the sea road around the northern end of Carmel.

18. Schumacher, "Die Aegypt. Hauptstrasse von der Ebene Sharon zur Ebene Jezreel," *MaNDPV*, 1903, p. 4.

19. There is still another road north of the *first road*, which, however, is really a branch of the *first road* for it starts from Tell Kaimûn and branching off from the main road to the right, ascends the Wady Milh and so on by Subbarn to the plain. As the northern end of this road reaches Esdrælon at the same spot as does the *first road*, for the purpose of this discussion it may be regarded as offering the same advantages or disadvantages as does the latter road. I have therefore not taken it up in detail, but consider that the arguments applied to the *first road* apply equally well to it.

tail the third and most important of the roads that cross the Ridge, that running from Tell el-Asâwir to Tell el-Mutesellim.

At the spot where the road from Tell el-Mutesellim and that from Tell Kaimûn meet was once a stronghold, to-day marked by the considerable mound of Tell el-Asâwir, which, together with a possible settlement on the site of the village of ez-Zebâdne<sup>20</sup> opposite, controlled the junction of these two important commercial highways. Starting from Tell el-Asâwir, the road enters the Wady 'Ârah, which is there one half to three quarters of a mile wide and is flat and open. There are evident traces of an old Roman road that once led through the wady. About four miles above Tell el-Asâwir lies 'Ain 'Ârah, the first of several springs that are scattered along the way (see View I). In fact, between this point and the outlet of the road near Tell el-Mutesellim, a distance of about nine miles, there are five or six good springs and wells and several smaller sources of water. It is by far the best provided in this respect of any of the roads that cross the Ridge. At 'Ain 'Ârah, where the modern village of 'Ârah stands, there was once a fortress which, with 'Ar'arah on the other side of the wady, commanded the junction of the road from Tell el-Aghbariyeh with that from Tell el-Mutesellim. Up to, and slightly beyond, the point where this road branches off, the wady remains open to a width of from a third to half a mile and with its excellent water supply offers abundant camping ground for an army of ten or fifteen thousand men preparing to cross the Ridge by either of the two roads (see View II). In fact, all the way from Tell el-Asâwir to a quarter of a mile above 'Ar'arah the valley is wide and level and is even cultivated some way up the slopes on either hand. In the spring of the year—the season at which I crossed this pass—when the grain is yet green, the prospect that meets the traveller's eye as he enters this wady is most pleasing. The ascent, moreover, is so gradual as to be scarcely perceptible and it is possible to drive a car-

20. Also apparently known locally as Wady 'Arah

21. This Tell is generally so designated both on the English Survey Map and in accounts of the region. Schumacher, *MuNDPV*, 1903, p. 5, in a very careful and detailed account of the region, speaks of it as "Tell es-Samra." There is undoubtedly a "Shirbet es-Samra" at that point, but my own inquiries in the neighborhood as to the name of the Tell seemed to show no unanimity of opinion on the part of the inhabitants of the district. I have therefore adhered to the name Tell el-Asâwir

riage even as far as the top of the pass at *Âin Ibrâhîm*.<sup>22</sup> The latter part of the ascent, from above *'Ain 'Ârah* to the head of the pass, is more narrow, contracting in places to a hundred yards or so. Just before the top is reached, a rough donkey-path turns off to the right and winds up the hillside to the village of *Umm el-Faḥm*, a notorious haunt of highwaymen, which nestles above in a theatre of hills opening to the northwest.

The top of the pass near *Âin Ibrâhîm* is about 1,200 feet above the sea, making a total rise from *'Ain 'Ârah* of only about 750 feet in approximately six miles. Throughout its length at intervals appear remains of the ancient Roman road, with here and there a milestone either in situ or lying near by. At *'Ain Ibrâhîm* the valley opens out to two hundred yards or so, as if to offer a halting place to the caravans before they enter upon the more abrupt descent on the northern side of the Ridge. From the top of the pass the road gradually descends, passing the village of *Mâsmûs* and winding about among the hills (see View III). It continues to decline for about a mile and a half, sinking some three hundred feet below the top of the pass. At this point the main valley turns to the right and reaches the plain a little to the south of Megiddo. It, however, is exceedingly narrow and rough and from its very formation could never have been used as a road, a conclusion which is strengthened by the fact that its opening is not marked by any settlement. When the road reaches the point where the valley makes this sudden turn, it continues straight on up a slight rise of about a hundred feet and then descends along a smaller wady (see View IV). This latter gradually contracts as it proceeds till, about half a mile above the mouth of the valley, it reaches its narrowest point, being not more than ten yards wide. A little further on the road takes a sudden turn and, opening out rapidly to a couple of hundred yards, it emerges upon the plain of *Lejjûn* (see View V). The opening of the valley is of sufficient width to allow a body of several thousand troops to assemble within it without having to overflow into the plain beyond. The road from *'Ain Ibrâhîm* to the opening of the valley is about three miles long and descends within that distance some six hundred and fifty feet, so that the descent on the north side is much steeper than is the ascent on the other side of the Ridge. Throughout the ascent on the south the road runs along the floor

22. I myself have gone by carriage to nearly a mile above *'Ar'arah*.

of the wady which is almost level (see View II). On the north of 'Ain Ibrâhîm, however, it is narrower and the bottom is therefore worn by the winter torrents which make it impassable as a road bed. The road here keeps some fifty feet up the slope on the west side of the wady, and for this reason is much rougher and narrower, not being capable in many places of accommodating more than two travellers abreast. The contrast between the ascent on the south and the descent on the north is therefore marked. The hills on either side slope down gradually towards the bottom of the valley (see View III). Of course such a road could be easily defended by a comparatively small number of men, but, on the other hand, an invading army could readily keep possession of the hills on either hand which are neither steep nor high above the valley. Nowhere, till a few hundred yards from the mouth of the pass, can a sight of Tell el-Mutesellim or its immediate surroundings be obtained by any one descending from 'Ain Ibrâhîm, though a watcher posted on the hill above Lejjûn could descry an approaching army at least a mile above the mouth of the pass.

The *second road*, that which runs from 'Ain 'Ârah to Tell el-Aghbariyeh, is a more difficult and less used road than the one to Tell el-Mutesellim. It is merely a rough mule-path totally different from the third road with which it connects. It rises "400 feet in 5 miles towards the watershed of Belâd er-Rûḥah. It passes by the old ruined Khân of el-Mawiyeh and through Kefrein, descending thence some 500 feet in 3 miles"<sup>23</sup> and reaches the plain at Tell el-Aghbariyeh. It was once perhaps the main line to Nazareth, but has been abandoned, as it crosses the Kishon at a spot where there are some dangerous pools. It now serves principally for the villages along its course.

Around the southern end of the Carmel Ridge runs the *fourth road* from ez-Zeita to Jenin by way of the Plain of 'Arrâbeh, which throughout the history of this region has served as an alternate route with that starting from Tell el-Mutesellim for the caravans coming down from Damascus to the coast plain.<sup>24</sup> This road is less shut in than are those through the heart of the Ridge, and to an invading army desirous of reaching the Plain of Esdraelon, it offers a more secure passage. Only on

<sup>23</sup> *Survey of Western Palestine*, II, p 50.

<sup>24</sup> Hartmann, *ZDMG*, 64, pp. 665 ff.



one side do the hills threaten the road. It enters the hills by the Wady el-Ghamik and then passes along the Plain of 'Arrâbeh near Dothan, descending by the Wady Belâmeh to Jenîn. The highest point is only 800 feet above sea level and the steepest gradient extends over about four miles of the way, where the rise is less than 100 feet per mile. In winter this is the usual road for travellers on horseback, as the *third road* where it crosses Esdraelon is impassable in winter.<sup>25</sup>

Skirting the southern edge of the Plain of Esdraelon under the shadow of the Ridge itself runs an old road that has served to connect the cities on the southern edge of the plain. Along its course it cuts through the various roads that cross the plain. At each such junction there stood in ancient times a fortified city, which thus guarded the entrance to its respective pass and controlled the commerce passing along the road. The entrance to the *first road* was guarded by the city that stood on Tell Keimûn. This spot probably marks the site of Jokneam<sup>26</sup> and by its relations both to the mountain pass and to the opening of the Plain of Esdraelon towards Acre must have early risen to considerable importance. At the mouth of the *second road* lies Tell el-Aghbariyeh,<sup>27</sup> once the site of an ancient stronghold. Tell el-Mutesellim, the spot where Megiddo once stood,<sup>28</sup> guards the entrance to the *third road*. Later this site was abandoned in favor of Lejjûn, about a mile away, directly at the mouth of the pass through which the *third road* crosses the Ridge.

25. *Survey of Western Palestine*, II, p. 50.

26. Robinson, *Later Bib. Researches*, p. 114. *Enc. Bib.* under Jokneam. *Survey of Western Palestine*, II, 48, says that it was "possibly the Cyamon of Judith (VII 3). The place is mentioned under its modern name in the Samaritan Book of Joshua. John of Wirtzburg (1100) calls it Cain Mons, 8 miles from Nazareth, near Carmel; Marino Sanuto (1321) says that Cain was here killed by an arrow by Lamech, and marks the place on his map in the position of Keimûn. Tetellus (1130) makes Kains Mons 10 miles from Acre, 3 miles from Carmel, and speaks of a fountain at its foot where Cain was killed. In the 'Onomasticon' it is called Cimona, and placed 6 Roman miles from Legio, on the way to Ptolemais." During the Crusades the fortress of Caymont occupied this site, and formed the center of one of the smaller Latin fiefs.

27. Dr. E. Graf von Mälinen, *MaNDPI*, 1908, p. 40, states that at this spot are two groups of houses which are called "ghubajja" which the Survey Map erroneously calls "aghbariyeh."

28. G. A. Smith, *Hist. Geog.*, pp. 386 ff., gives the evidence for the identification of the location of Megiddo as follows: "At the base of the central plain, just opposite Jezreel, is a place called Lejjun—the Roman Legio, Legion, at the mouth of the chief pass towards Sharon. It was, therefore, as important a site as Jezreel, and as likely to give its name to the plain. In Roman times it did so. Jerome calls the great plain both the Plains of Megiddo and the Campus Legionis. Moreover the only town definitely named in the immediate neighborhood of Megiddo—Taanach upon the waters of Megiddo—is undoubtedly the present Tannuk, four miles from

The *fourth road*, round the southern end of the hills, was controlled by Jezreel and to a certain extent by Taanach. The size of the tells that mark this line of cities testifies to the importance that their location gave them in ancient times. This whole road is also abundantly supplied with water.

At Tell el-Mutesellim the Carmel Ridge suddenly recedes from the plain, forming a great bay or indentation in the hills about a mile deep and a mile and a half wide. The center of this bay is occupied by a group of mounds<sup>29</sup> on the highest point of which stands the Tell (see View VI). Between the mounds, marked G, H, I on Map II, and the foothills enclosing the bay is a narrow stretch of flat, cultivated land which thus separates the mounds, of which the Tell forms a part, from the main Ridge (see View VII).

To the north and east of the Tell extends the Plain of Esdrælon, gradually sloping away from the Ridge to the Kishon in the midst of the plain. The site of the city projects slightly beyond the line of the Carmel Ridge, Megiddo enjoying thereby one of the most commanding positions in Palestine.<sup>30</sup> The whole plain lay stretched out before the inhabitants of the city, who thus obtained a sight of all who passed along the roads across the plain.

The low foothills, A, B, C, D and E, which enclose the bay, rise to an average height of about two or three hundred feet above the cultivated land at their base. With the exception of B, which is lava, they are of

Lejjun; and there even seems a trace of the name in the name the Arabs give to Kishon, the Muqatta. Omitting this last item, we have enough of evidence to support Robinson's identification of Lejjun with Megiddo, even against the plausible rival which Major Condor has favored in Mujedda', a site with considerable ruins at the foot of Gilboa, above Jordan and near Beisan." To this evidence may be added that from the Annals of Thutmose III in which, as Breasted, *Ancient Records*, II, 426, note d, points out, the Asiatic army, which fights a battle before Megiddo, has its south wing at Taanach; hence Megiddo must have lain not far to the north of Taanach. The city also lay near the opening of the middle one of three roads that cross the Ridge, the southernmost of which came out near Taanach, I have already shown where, according to the conformation of the country, this road must have lain, and just at the mouth of the middle road is Tell el-Mutesellim. For a refutation of Condor's identification see G. A. Smith, *Hist. Geog.*, p. 887, note.

29. I have here used the term "mound" to distinguish these three elevations from the "hills" behind them and from the "knoll" F. They are, of course, not artificial mounds but natural elevations.

30. Hall, *Anc. Hist. of the Near East*, p. 235, erroneously states that "both towns" (Megiddo and Taanach) "stand back behind the ridge halfway down to the plain." In walking across Esdrælon from Megiddo to Nazareth, I have been impressed with the remarkable site that Megiddo occupied, the Tell forming one of the most conspicuous features of the landscape.

limestone formation, to-day totally devoid of trees and covered with a scant growth of thorns and bunch grass. The limestone is laid bare here and there on their sides, which form a succession of rough ledges where the scanty soil has been washed away by the heavy winter rains (see View IX). If these hills were ever under cultivation, all traces of it have entirely disappeared. Their sides are of moderate steepness, rising at an angle of  $15^{\circ}$  to  $20^{\circ}$ . At the point marked K there is a break in the encircling hills, the cultivated land extending into the gap for some distance till it gradually terminates in rocky land as the hills again approach the plain. Beyond the gap K the enclosing hills terminate in an isolated knoll, marked F on Map II, which rises only about seventy-five or a hundred feet above the surrounding land. This knoll is also of limestone formation, though the slopes are not quite so rocky as are those of the foothills just described (see View V).

Between the hills A and B, and B and C the wadies are small and run back for only a short distance till they are lost in the hills behind. Between C and D is a wide opening known as Wady es-Sitt, receding for some two miles into the range (see View X). At the head of this wady is a perennial spring, 'Ain es-Sitt, of considerable size, the stream which I have identified with the Brook Kina of the Egyptian sources (see Map II). Between hills D and E is the opening of the pass over the Ridge along which the Egyptian army advanced on Megiddo. The cultivated land lying between these foothills and the group of mounds G, H, and I, on which Megiddo stood, is flat and free from large stones. At the northern end opposite Megiddo this strip is about a fifth of a mile wide, gradually broadening as it sweeps around to the south and east till opposite the mouth of the pass it attains a width of about half a mile (see View VII). Across this strip of land the Kina has cut a channel, ranging from two to three feet deep at the opening of the Wady es-Sitt, marked "a" on Map II, to fifteen or eighteen feet deep at the point "b" and beyond (See View XI). After crossing the cultivated land the brook turns at right angles and runs along the edge of the mounds H and I, turning again so as to flow between the mound I and the knoll F, till it enters the plain of Esdrælon. The channel of the stream is uniformly fifteen to twenty feet below the bank on either hand. These banks are fairly steep and continue so till they fall away gradually, so that at "c" it is

possible for the road to Taanach to cross the stream with only a slight descent of three or four feet. At "b" a road crosses the stream by a steep descent, while at "d" there is a bridge.

The two mounds G and H, together with the Tell, are really one, though they are separated by slight depressions. The Tell is the highest part of the group, being 125 feet above 'Ain el-Ḳubbi at its northern base. The mound G is slightly lower, averaging about one hundred feet above the 'Ain. Between the two is a narrow cut or trench, possibly partly artificial, having been dug out as a sort of dry moat to render the the city less accessible on that side, but partly caused by the gradual rising of the Tell from age to age, as city after city was built and destroyed on its site. This depression is some thirty feet deep. The surface of mound G is level, except for the ruins of Græco-Roman structures with which it is to-day encumbered. Between G and H there is only a slight depression of a few feet. The surface of H is also covered with remains of late buildings and is, moreover, by nature not so level as is G. Between the two mounds G and H and the mound I there is a considerable depression through which at present a road runs. I is much lower than H, rising not more than forty to fifty feet above 'Ain el-Ḳubbi. Its surface is level.

The sides of the Tell slope sharply to the plain on either hand, running down at about an angle of 30° in many places (see View XII). The sides of the mounds G, H, and I are much more gradual for the most part, except on the side where H borders on the brook Kina, at which place the land descends more abruptly to the bed of the stream. On the west of these mounds the ascent is gradual (see View XIII), so much so that a wheeled vehicle could with ease drive on to the mounds from that side. The north side of the Tell descends to a sort of terrace raised some feet above the plain beyond. Just below this terrace is the spring, 'Ain el-Ḳubbi, which in ancient times supplied the inhabitants of Megiddo with water.

Along the east side of the Tell runs the road spoken of on page 13 as connecting the line of cities which guarded the series of crossroads on the northern side of the Carmel Ridge. From, or across, this road at the points marked e, f, g, h, and i, run other roads all of which converge on the mouth of the pass leading over the Ridge south of the

city. No better evidence of the importance of this same pass could be offered than the presence of these five roads all leading into this one valley.

At about the time of Thutmose III's campaign Megiddo was a strongly fortified place. Its defences consisted of a massive brick wall enclosing an area roughly oval in shape, some three hundred and fifteen meters long by two hundred and thirty meters wide.<sup>31</sup> The wall, supported by buttresses at intervals, was about ten meters high and six meters thick, protected especially on the south and west against the driving of the winter rains by a projecting glacis. There is no evidence of a moat around the city, though on the south the Tell is separated from the mound G by the depression already spoken of. The excavations have disclosed only two gates, one on the south and one on the north,<sup>32</sup> though there were probably others as yet undiscovered. The city's natural defences were weakest on the south and west, where the height of the Tell above the plain is much less than on the east and north. This may in part account for the fact that the projecting glacis along the foot of the wall is broadest on those sides, thus rendering it more difficult to scale the wall with ladders.<sup>33</sup>

Megiddo makes its advent into history with the first campaign of Thutmose III. That its story runs far back of any written record is certain, not only from the evidence of neolithic settlement on the site which the excavation of the Tell has disclosed,<sup>34</sup> but also because we cannot suppose that a situation so favorable to human habitation would not have been early occupied. Its abundant water supply,<sup>35</sup> its isolated position rendering it easily defensible on all sides, its close relation to the rich plain of Esdrælon, and finally, when commerce had developed, its command of the natural highway from Mesopotamia to Egypt, would all offer unusual inducements to the growth of a large and flourishing settlement. However, its situation on the great artery of commerce was the most determining factor.<sup>36</sup> In the early world, after trade be-

31. Schumacher, *Tell el-Mutesellim*, I, p. 23 ff.

32. Schumacher, *op. cit.*, I, p. 77 ff. and p. 47

33. Cf. Holscher, *Hohes Tor von Medinet Habu*, p. 63.

34. Schumacher, *op. cit.*, I, p. 11 ff.

35. The Kina, which flows by the Tell, is the most considerable affluent of the Kishon on the south.

36. This was the road across the Ridge mentioned in the Tabula Peutingeriana and was in Arab times, except during the supremacy of the Crusaders, the regular way for the caravans

tween Egypt and the north had taken extensively to the land route, such cities undoubtedly collected heavy toll from the passing caravans of merchants, much as did the feudal barons of the Middle Ages.

Not only did Megiddo command the great route from Mesopotamia, but it also lay on the road connecting the Phœnician Plain with the hills of Ephraim and Judah. The commerce which sought these highlands came down from the coast cities and, turning inland after it left Acre, passed through the narrow gap at the northern end of Esdrælon, along the base of the Carmel Ridge, by Megiddo and Taanach, and on to Samaria and Jerusalem.<sup>37</sup> While these trade routes flourished, Megiddo or its successor Legio (modern Lejjûn), were prominent cities, but when commerce lapsed or was diverted elsewhere, they sank into insignificance.

But the military significance of Megiddo was not less marked than was its commercial importance. The Carmel Ridge, cutting through the coast plain to the very shore of the sea, stands like a rampart erected against an attack on Syria from the south. All south of Carmel is the level, uninterrupted coast plain, stretching into the Sinaitic desert south of Gaza. From this latter point to the boundaries of Egypt is desert save for the few wells or springs at intervals along the road. The Egyptian invader of Syria has met opposition between the Delta and Carmel only at one point, the neighborhood of Gaza,<sup>38</sup> where the desert meets the fertile land of the Philistine Plain. Did the Egyptian encounter defeat at this point, he found himself in a dangerous situation indeed, with only the desert road behind him and no refuge from a pursuing foe till the frontier forts at Tharu were reached. Thus any campaign that aimed at gaining the Plain of Esdrælon fell naturally into three movements: first, the advance to Gaza; second, the advance along the Philistine Plain; and third, the crossing of the Carmel Ridge.

In the Annals these natural stages in the campaign have been noted, showing that already the military commanders of the day conducted no haphazard warfare, but took into account the larger problems of

from Damascus to Cairo. See Hartmann, "Die Strasse von Damaskus nach Kairo," *ZDMG*, 64, p. 665 ff.

37. This was the route frequently followed by the Assyrian armies, and later by the pilgrims of the Middle Ages.

38. G. A. Smith, *Hist. Geog.*, p. 184. Olmstead, *Sargon of Assyria*, p. 54.

military tactics, and were fully aware of the importance in the successful manipulation of troops attached to an accurate knowledge of the topography of the field of operations.<sup>39</sup> The Egyptian wars of liberation had developed the first known school of military experts at all commensurable with modern army boards.

Why the Allies did not meet Thutmose's advance in the neighborhood of Gaza is not entirely clear. For one thing, such a move would have taken them far from their northern base of operations. Moreover, the south seems to have been either friendly, or, at most, not actively hostile, to the Egyptians. The fact that the list of the cities said to have been "captured" on the first campaign<sup>40</sup> includes the names of many towns in southern Palestine, would not weigh heavily against this view, when we take into consideration the evident fact that, in all the lists of conquered cities, any places of importance included within the field of operations were regularly enumerated, whether they had been loyal to the Pharaoh or had rebelled.

Suffice it to say that, having failed to seize the first natural point of resistance to the Egyptians, the King of Kadesh took up his position at the next natural rampart, the Carmel Ridge. There he could secure the most advantageous position for repulsing the invaders. That, having shown his appreciation of the strength of this position by deliberately taking his stand at Megiddo, he should then have thrown away the advantage afforded by the narrowness of the mountain pass through which Thutmose was compelled to move, is as remarkable as it is inexplicable.<sup>41</sup> At any rate the Allies permitted Thutmose to accomplish the first two movements of the campaign, the march to Gaza and thence to the

39. The *Annals* give in connection with this campaign the dates of the following events: (1) the departure from Tharu, (2) the arrival at Gaza, (3) the departure from Gaza, (4) the arrival at Yehem, (5) the departure from 'Aruna, (6) the Battle of Megiddo. The first two dates mark the first stage of the campaign; the second two, the second stage; and the last two, the third stage.

40. *Urk*, IV, pp. 779-786.

41. The military importance of this road is evident from the fact that the Romans placed a strong force at the northern end, at Legio, modern Lejjûn, the actual camp itself probably occupying the knoll marked F on Map II. Cf. Schumacher, *Tell el-Mutesellim*, I, p 88. G. A. Smith, *Hist. Geog.*, p. 389, calls attention to the frequent occurrence of the names Bethshan, Taanach, Megiddo, Dor, as marking a line of fortresses "on the one great avenue across country", and refers to Josh. xxvi, 11; Judges i, 27; I Kings iv, 12; I Chron. vii, 29. These cities were all strong fortresses and held out against the Hebrew attempts at conquest, remaining Canaanite till late in their history.

Carmel Ridge, without opposition, nor do they seem in any way to have taken advantage of the difficulties the Egyptians encountered in accomplishing the third movement to strike Thutmose under circumstances so favorable to the success of the Allies. Our meager sources must leave us forever ignorant of the reasons of the Allies for thus throwing away their greatest chance of victory.



## II

## THE PROBLEM OF THE CARMEL RIDGE

## THE ANNALS, LINES 18-49

Urk. 649 [ His Majesty ] commanded (19) to counsel together with his victorious army. saying, "Now that [wretched] enemy (20) of Kedesh, having come and having entered into Megiddo, he is [there](21) at this moment. He has assembled to himself the chiefs of [all] the countries [which were] (22) subject to Egypt as far as Naharin, consisting of ..... (23) the Kharu, the Kode, their troops,[their people;](24) for he says, it is reported, 'I am ready to [fight against his Majesty here](25) in Megiddo'. Tell ye me [that which is in your hearts.]"

(26) They said in the presence of his Majesty, "How is it possible to march <sup>42</sup> upon(27) this road which becomes narrower?

It is [reported] (28) saying, 'The enemy are there, ready upon Urk. 650 [the outside,<sup>43</sup> and they are] (29) becoming numerous.' Will not horse go behind [horse, the troops] (30) and the people likewise? Shall our vanguard be (31) fighting, while the [rear-guard] is yet standing (32) in 'Aruna, without their having fought? Now there are still two roads. (33) One road, behold it is ..... our .....<sup>44</sup> it comes out at (34) Taanach.

42. Lit. "It is like what to go upon this road?"

43. So Sethe's restoration, probably taken from *Urk.* IV, 655, 5, where it undoubtedly refers to the king waiting at the mouth of the pass. This restoration would then suppose that the messengers report the enemy to be assembled at the pass "outside" the valley or the mountains. Breasted, *Ancient Records*, II, 421, restores "holding the way against a multitude" which would seem to fill the lacuna as well as Sethe's as far as the hieroglyphics are concerned, though the report of the messengers would not then agree with the situation as disclosed on the king's arrival at the mouth of the pass.

44. Sethe restores, "Behold it is excellent for our lord". Hall, *Anc. Hist. of the Near East*, p. 236, gives "there is that one which is best for us". Breasted, *Ancient Records*, II,

The other, behold it is at the (35) north side<sup>45</sup> of Zefiti, so that we shall come out at the north of Megiddo. (36) Let our victorious lord proceed according to the de[sign of] his heart therein, (37) but do not cause us to march upon this impassable road." Then [were brought] (38) messages concerning [that wretched] foe. [Then was reported the information?] concerning [this] matter (39) which they had mentioned before.

Urk. 651 Spoken in the Majesty of the Court, L.P.H. "I [swear] (40) as Re loves me, as my father Amon favors me, as my nostrils are renewed (41) with satisfying life, my Majesty proceeds upon this 'Aruna road. (42) Let him whose desire it is among you march along these (43) roads you have mentioned. Let him whose desire it is among you go (44) in the following of my Majesty. Do not let them think among these (45) enemies whom Re detests, 'Does his Majesty proceed upon (46) another road (because) he is beginning to fear us?' (So) they will think." (47) They said in the presence of his Majesty; "May thy father Amon, Lord of Thebes, Presider over Karnak, do [according to thy desire.] (48) Behold us as the following of thy Majesty in whatever place [thy Majesty] proceeds. (49) The servant is at the back of [his] lord."

Having arrived at Yehem, somewhere on the south of the Carmel Ridge, Thutmose halted long enough to hold a council of war, as the *Annals* puts it, with "his troops". The messengers which appear later in the account, were undoubtedly spies who had been sent ahead by the Pharaoh to ascertain the whereabouts of the enemy. In all probability it was their return with the news of the preparation made by the Allies on the north of the Ridge to check the Egyptian advance that led the Pharaoh to call the council. There will certainly have been frequent conferences between the Pharaoh and his officers. The priestly scribe

421, gives, "one road, behold, it will . . . us". Maspero, *Recueil*, II, p. 52, gives, "un chemin voici qu'il nous mettra sur la grande route à l'Ouest de Taanaka". The remarkable thing about this passage is that on it several historians have based a statement that the officers advocated one of the roads in preference to the other, when, as a matter of fact, we do not know what they said of the Taanach road, owing to the lacuna, while they certainly did not say that the Zefiti road was preferable.

45. Or, "at the road north of Zefiti". This, however, is improbable, as the *Annalist* never elsewhere uses *zw'-t* of "road" but prefers *mtw* instead.

who made these excerpts from the daily records of the campaign gives us such full details of this particular council because of the importance of its decisions on subsequent events, but chiefly because it brings out prominently the fearlessness of the king in contrast to the cautious nature of his officers. Like many oriental military records the doings of subordinates are introduced only as a foil to the overshadowing figure of the monarch.

The king opens the conference by laying before his officers the information received: first, that the King of Kadesh has already occupied Megiddo; second, that he is at the head of a strong coalition reaching as far as Naharin in the north; and, third, that he is preparing to make a stand at Megiddo against the Egyptian army. In view of this situation the king asks the advice of his officers as to how to proceed. Such is the brief account given in the Annals of the drift of the royal speech. However, as the officers at once begin to object to the advance by the direct road, we must suppose that the king had already pointed out this road as the one he intended to take.

Upon hearing the royal decision the officers seem to have been dismayed, though we may be sure that their consternation has suffered no diminution at the pen of the royal secretary, who would seek thereby to enhance his master's own reputation for daring. The interrogative form of their reply (lit. "It is like what to go upon this road which becomes narrower?"), trembles with their surprise and fear. They at once raise the objection that the spies have brought information to the effect that the enemy are waiting just outside the pass the king has chosen and that they are, in all probability, very numerous, or, if we accept Breasted's restoration,<sup>46</sup> they are making great preparations to dispute this very road with the Egyptians. Besides, the officers declare, the road is too narrow to allow of any military formation being maintained.<sup>47</sup> The army will be strung out in such a long, thin line that the advance guard will already have come in contact with the enemy before the

46. *Ancient Records*, II, 421.

47. An interesting commentary on this statement is the passage from Judith, iv, 6-7; "Also Joacim the high priest, which was in those days in Jerusalem, wrote to them that dwelt in Bethulia and Betomestham, which is over against Esdra'lon, towards the open country, near to Dorthaim, charging them to keep the passages of the hill country: for by them there was an entrance into Jud-a, and it was easy to stop them that would come up, because the passage was strait, for two men at most", or, as a variant has it, "as they came up, the pass being narrow, in double

rear guard has left 'Aruna. As alternative routes they suggest two other roads,<sup>48</sup> one of which issues from the mountains in the direction of Taanach, and the other of which, passing on the north of Zefiti, issues to the north of Megiddo.<sup>49</sup> The royal wrath at this objection to the 'Aruna road was probably apparent by this time, for the officers close their advice by acknowledging the supremacy of the Pharaoh's will, but still they beg that he will not choose the difficult mountain pass. In support of their request they further submit the report of the spies to which they had already referred.

The situation in which the Egyptian army now found itself is evident from the foregoing account of the progress of the council. It is apparent that the halt was made at Yeḥem, because, in view of the report of the spies, it was necessary for those in charge of the campaign to decide how the Ridge, lying between them and the enemy, was to be crossed. Yeḥem lay at, or near, the junction of three well-known roads, and it now be-

file at most." The actual character of this pass is an interesting illustration of the meaning of the Egyptian phrase *zw' r*, the various suggestions in regard to the meaning of which I have mentioned in note 5. As the traveller advances along the road, he is impressed by the fact that the wady becomes steadily narrower (see pages 10-12) thus conforming to the idea of a gradual change of condition for the worse, which seems to underlie the Egyptian idiom.

48. Maspero, *Struggle of the Nations*, p. 256, states that the officers of the king advised Thutmose to follow the road that ran to the north of Zefiti. There is no evidence for this statement in the Annals, as they specifically state that two roads were suggested, either of which were acceptable to the generals. Budge, *Hist. of Egypt*, IV, p. 32, makes the statement that "of three roads that lead to Megiddo, two were rejected by the generals as unsuitable, but the king decided to march there by one of them." There is a break in the inscription at this point where Sethe restores "One road, behold it is excellent for our lord; it comes out at Taanach." The surviving portions of the Annals, however, contain nothing to indicate that any preference was expressed by the officers.

49. Maspero, *Struggle of the Nations*, p. 257, note 1, (as mentioned on p. 7, note 14) locates Yeḥem at el-Kheimh and identifies Zefiti with Saffa, about half way between Jerusalem and Jaffa. He says, "The third road ran north of Zaṭiti, to meet the great highway that cuts the hill district of Nablus, skirting the foot of Tabor near Jenin, a little to the north of Megiddo." There are certain objections to this identification. In the first place, it is difficult to see why it should have taken the Egyptians from the fifth to the sixteenth of the month to cover the short distance from Gaza to Saffa, something less than fifty miles, while for the next fifty miles, from Saffa to the Carmel Ridge, they required only from the sixteenth to the nineteenth. The second fifty miles will also have been through the more hostile portion of the country where one would expect the progress to have been slower. In the second place, the road by Taanach, which was suggested as an alternate route to the one north of Zefiti, would enter the Plain of Esdraelon at almost exactly the same spot as the road from Nablus to Jenin and the latter road would therefore offer no advantages over the Taanach road for an army operating against Megiddo. Moreover, one fails to see why the officers should have desired to take a road which skirted "the foot of Tabor near Jenin", coming out on the north of Megiddo, when they would thereby expose their line of communication with the south to the attack of the enemy, and would also have to march across the whole width of Esdraelon only to march back again to Megiddo.

came necessary, before advancing further, to decide upon one of these roads as the route to be pursued.<sup>49</sup> The king favored the one known as the 'Aruna road, which we learn from the later developments of the campaign, issued from the mountains at Megiddo. It is described as being very narrow and difficult, but in this matter due allowance must be made for exaggeration on the part of the officers who desired to avoid it and who would naturally paint its disadvantages in the most lurid hues. That this road crossed the Ridge between the two roads which the officers favored is also evident, for one of these latter roads entered the plain towards Taanach, which is to the south of Megiddo, and the other road is specifically stated to have issued from the mountains north of Megiddo.

That the Pharaoh's officers were familiar with the country before them is evident. Possibly the spies who had been sent forward to reconnoitre had brought back information in regard to these mountain passes, though the campaigns and commerce of the preceding century must also have made the Egyptians fully acquainted with the roads of Palestine-Syria, especially with the great route to and from the Euphrates. This same road across the Carmel Ridge apparently did not enjoy a very savory reputation among the Egyptians. It is probably that described in Papyrus Anastasi I, where its dangers and difficulties are dwelt on with a wealth of harrowing detail, including wild men of more than human ferocity, and deep gorges such as are scarcely found in Palestine at all and certainly not in the region of Megiddo.<sup>50</sup> This description of the famous road cannot be taken seriously. It is in the general tone of the rest of this remarkable papyrus, exaggerated and distorted beyond all measure wherever the writer is describing the utter incompetency and cowardice of the "Maher", and designed throughout to exhibit the writer's erudition and knowledge of strange words and names. Although, of course, the papyrus dates from several hundred

49. For a discussion of the historical importance of these passes see G. A. Smith, *Hist. Geog.*, p. 150 ff.

50. Gardiner, *Hieratic Texts*, I, pp. 25-27: "Behold the . . . is in a ravine two thousand cubits deep, filled with boulders and pebbles. \* \* \* \* \* The (?) narrow defile is infested (?) with Shosu concealed beneath the bushes; some of them are of four cubits, or of five cubits, from head (?) to foot (?), fierce of face, their heart is not mild, and they hearken not to coaxing. \* \* \* \* \* Thy path is filled with boulders and pebbles, without a passable track (?) overgrown with reeds and brambles, briars and wolf-pads. The ravine is on one side of thee, the mountain rises on the other."

red years after the Megiddo campaign,<sup>51</sup> it still serves to show that the road was regarded as rough and dangerous, even when Syria was far better known to the Egyptians than in Thutmose's day.

Roads, especially where they are not paved, shift from age to age. In the Orient this is especially true of the roads that traverse the plains. New paths are constantly being made, their direction being governed largely by the rise or fall of towns and by shifts in the trend of commerce.<sup>52</sup> One has only to note the Roman roads, remains of which still survive throughout Syria and Palestine but so many of which no longer mark lines of travel, to note how impossible it is to dogmatize on the location of an ancient road from data furnished by modern roads. In mountainous regions, however, we have data on which to base a conclusion in regard to the location of an ancient road that do not exist in the case of more level country. We can rest assured that in ancient, as in classical, mediæval and modern times, roads which crossed mountain ranges followed the courses marked out by nature, the passes which still exist to-day. When, therefore, we look for the roads which Thutmose's council discussed and which crossed the Carmel Ridge, we can turn to the map of the country as it is to-day and feel assured that from it we can learn with reasonable certainty the possible routes by which the Ridge would have been crossed in antiquity. That there was no road, other than a rough donkey-path, over the southern end of Umm el-Faḥm is obvious from any careful study of the map. Or that any army wishing to go from the coast plain by the most direct road to Megiddo should choose any other route than that by the Wady 'Ârah is difficult to conceive. Any other course would have necessitated the scaling of a succession of rough hills, a most fatiguing and unnecessary labor, when right at hand lay a direct and easy course along the bottom of the wady which led directly to the desired goal. In the preceding description of the Carmel Ridge, I have pointed out the fact that all the passes of the mountain are occupied to-day by roads. Therefore, in discussing the situation that now confronted Thutmose, I shall take it for granted that the roads considered by the council of war were essentially the same, as far as location goes, with those that cross the Ridge to-day and the his-

51. Gardiner, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

52. Cf. Ramsey, *Hist. Geog. of Asia Minor*, p. 83.

tory of which we can trace back to Roman times in the remains of the paving still in situ.

A glance at Map I will show the road the king advocated. The road can be none other than the one running from Tell el-Asâwir by 'Ain 'Ârah past 'Ain Ibrâhîm to Megiddo. The king evidently preferred to make directly for the enemy's position. The officers, on the other hand, feared the narrow mountain defile, where the army would be strung out in a long line and so would be particularly liable to attack. The enemy, sweeping down from the heights on either hand, would be able to cut such a line in two and do great damage before any united resistance could be offered. The gentle slopes leading into the wady would offer opportunities for a considerable body of men to make such a descent with ease on any army crossing the pass (see View III). If, on the contrary, Megiddo could be approached from the side of the plain, not only would the dangers of the pass be avoided, but ample opportunity would be given for the use of the chariotry,<sup>53</sup> which branch of the service would be only a hinderance in the mountain defile. The officers, therefore, advocated either one of two other roads. One of these came out of the mountains towards Taanach. This can have been none other than the one running around the southern end of the Ridge through the Plain of 'Arrâbeh, entering Esdrælon in the neighborhood of Jenîn.<sup>54</sup> By pursuing this course, the plain could be reached considerably to the south of Megiddo and the advance on the city could then be made by way of Taanach. Here too the open plain would offer ample opportunity for manœuvres and would enable the Egyptians to bring all their force into action at once, thus avoiding the danger of their being defeated in detail, as might be the case if they took the 'Aruna road.

The other road favored by the council is less certain of identification. It is possible that it may have been the road branching off from the Wady 'Ârah at 'Ain 'Ârah and issuing from the mountains near Tell el-Aghbariyeh. This, however, seems very unlikely as the road reaches

53. During the rainy season the plain is very muddy and in the middle is often impassable, owing to the fact that the drainage from the plain cannot be readily carried off. However, by the time Thutmose reached this region in May, most of the plain would have been dry enough to allow of the free use of chariots upon the level, cultivated fields.

54. The advice of the officers would seem to have been dictated by ordinary military prudence, and we cannot but feel that Thutmose was assuming grave responsibilities and taking great risks when he disregarded it. The king's choice, however, was justified by the event.

the plain only a short distance from Megiddo and would have been open to practically the same disadvantages as was the direct road to Megiddo. Moreover, as 'Aruna probably lay near the junction of these two roads, the term "'Aruna Road", used constantly throughout the Annals to apply to the middle one of the three chief roads, might equally well apply to either of these two roads. The Annalist would most probably have used some other term to apply to the road that issued at Megiddo, (*the third road*) had he been contrasting it with the road to Tell el-Aghbariyeh (*the second road*). The road from Tell el-Asâwir to Tell Kaimûn seems most likely to have been the "road north of Zefti", being the counterpart on the north to the road around the southern end of the Ridge towards Taanach. The only other route, that around the seaward end of Carmel, is too great a detour to have been seriously considered. By taking the road issuing from the mountains at Tell Kaimûn, the advantages mentioned as being derived from the use of the *fourth road* would be equally well secured, except that the *fourth road* is somewhat easier for chariots. In any case it is obvious that the officers desired to reach the open country on the other side of the Ridge before encountering the enemy, hence their very evident reluctance to follow the Pharaoh along the direct road to Megiddo.

In answer to the objections of his officers, Thutmose's anger blazed up. His reply is one of the most remarkable royal utterances in all the range of ancient oriental records and fairly rings not only with wrath but also with contempt. We can picture to ourselves the Pharaoh rising from his seat as he ends the council in disgust and with scorn bidding those of his officers who are afraid to accompany him follow the road their fears dictate, but calling upon those who would stand by him to follow his lead, adding, as a final rebuke, "They shall not think among the enemy whom Re detests, 'Does his Majesty proceed upon another road because he is beginning to fear us?'" It is the first instance in history of one born to lead calling upon him who will to follow him into danger or be forever branded a coward. And in the reply of the officers we hear not only the abject submission of the courtier who has offended royalty, but the shamed acquiescence of the soldier caught in a situation where he may be accused of cowardice; "Behold us as the following of thy Majesty in whatever place thy Majesty proceeds."



## III

## THE CROSSING OF THE CARMEL RIDGE

## THE ANNALS, LINES 49-84

Urk. 652 [His Majesty commanded to issue] (50) orders to the entire army.....<sup>55</sup> (51) this road which was becoming narrow. [Behold his Majesty took] (52) an oath, saying, "I will not permit [my victorious army] to set out (53) in advance of my Majesty.".....<sup>56</sup> (54) He set out in advance of his troops himself. [Every man] was assigned (55) his position,<sup>57</sup> horse behind horse, [his Majesty] being (56) at the head of his troops.

Year 23, first month of the third season, day 19; the watch in [life]<sup>58</sup> (57) at the royal tent was at the city of 'Aruna. My Majesty proceeded (58) northward, bearing<sup>59</sup> his father Amon-Re, Lord of Thebes, [who opened the way] (59) before me,

55. Sethe's restoration would read; "Your victorious lord will protect your footsteps upon this road, etc."

56. Sethe restores; "Now his Majesty proposed (*rdy-n*) in his heart that he set out".

57. Lit. "His steps of marching".

58. A technical phrase. It occurs again in *Urk.* IV, 656, 13, and also in Ramses II's record of the Kadesh campaign (Breasted, *Battle of Kadesh*, p. 18.) The second occurrence in the Annals is probably Sethe's authority for the restoration of "life" in the present passage. In Ramses' inscription the phrase reads, "The goodly watch in life, prosperity and health in the tent of his Majesty was on the height south of Kadesh." Ramses' phrase is obviously the complete form, which is abbreviated in the Annals. I take it that the "Watch in life, prosperity and health" is a technical phrase for the royal body-guard or the guard especially detailed to protect the royal tent. In that case, both here and in *Urk.* IV, 656, 13, we may have a nominal sentence which would read, "The watch in life was in the tent of the king". As such a guard would undoubtedly be stationed as soon as the king's tent was pitched at the time of setting up camp, the phrase in our text would then become equivalent to "The camp was pitched at 'Aruna". On the restoration of 'nh in the text, see Breasted, *Ancient Records* II, 425, note a.

59. Lit. "under". *Hr* sometimes contains so much of the idea of motion that it is construed with the preposition *r*, as in *Urk.* IV, p. 310, where *hr* is used of carrying the sacred image of Amon (*hr yt-f Ymn r hb-f*) across the river to one of his great feasts. It is not necessary to translate the passage "under the protection of" as does Breasted, *Ancient Records*, II, 425, nor to omit the sign altogether as Maspero, *Recueil*, II, p. 56. The same word, *hr*, is used of transporting Amon-of-the-Ways in the Report of Wenamon; see *Recueil*, XXI, p. 89.

Urk. 653 Herakhte was.. (90) my father Amon..... strength of sword.....(61) my Majesty.

His Majesty went forth [at the head of] his [troops] prepared (62) in numerous battle-array..... one. [Their] (63) south wing was at Taanach, [while their] (64) north wing was at the southern corner of [the valley of the Kina.<sup>60</sup> Then] (65) his Majesty cried out upon.....(66) They are fallen. Now, that [wretched] enemy..... (67) .....

Urk. 654 ... (68) ..... Amon ..... (69) ..... ye of (70) ..... his Majesty for his might more than (71) ... ..Troops of his Majesty in (72) 'Aruna.

Now the rearguard of the victorious troops of his Majesty was at the [city] of (73) 'Aruna when the vanguard issued at the valley of the Kina. (74) They filled the mouth of the valley.

Then they said in the presence of his Majesty, L. P. H., (75) "Behold, his Majesty goes forth together with his victorious troops and they fill the (76) valley. Let our victorious lord harken to us this time (77) and let our lord guard for us the rear

Urk. 655 of his troops and his people. (78) When the rear of the troops goes forth for us, then we shall fight against (79) these Asiatics; then we shall not give thought [to] the rear of (80) our army."<sup>61</sup> His Majesty halted outside, waiting ..... (81) there, guarding the rear of his victorious army.

Now the rear of the expedition (82) was going out upon this road, when the shadow turned, (83) and his Majesty arrived at the south of Megiddo on the bank of the Brook Kina, when it was seven hours from the turning by the sun.

Then the camp of his Majesty was pitched there and com-  
Urk. 656 mand was given to the entire army, saying, "Prepare yourselves; make ready your weapons, for one is to advance to fight with this wretched enemy in the morning." Wherefore one was

60. The portion of the text preserved may also read, "Their south wing was at the corner south of". Sethe restores; "south of the Brook Kina," which restoration I have, in part, followed for reasons given later. As far as the size of the lacuna goes the original might have read, "south of the city of Megiddo.

61. This passage must be added to those cited by Breasted, *Ancient Records*, 11, 39, note d, as instances of a real patriotic feeling evinced by the use of the phrase "our troops".

proceeding (84) to rest in the royal tent. The officers were provided for,<sup>62</sup> Provisions for the court were secured. The sentries of the army made the rounds.<sup>63</sup> They said, "Steadfast! Steadfast! Watchful! Watchful!" The watch in life was at the royal tent. One came to report to his Majesty, "The land is well;<sup>64</sup> the troops of the north and the south likewise."

When the council had broken up, the king gave orders to set out on the 'Aruna road. It is significant that the records so strongly emphasize the fact that the king led the line of march in person. After the vigorous reprimand he had given his officers at the council, he could do no less than occupy the place of danger himself. He would thereby also be able the better to prevent any surprise by the enemy and would encourage his men by his own example. So, the necessary orders having been given for the disposition of the troops during the crossing of the mountains, the army set out.

At the most commanding position in the pass lies the modern village of 'Ar'arah, which has been identified with the ancient 'Aruna.<sup>65</sup> In support of this identification it may be argued that; first, if the road running from Tell el-Asâwir to Megiddo is the 'Aruna road referred to in the Annals, then somewhere along the course of the road we must look for the city of 'Aruna as occupying a prominent position. Second, the city must have lain well within the pass, for the Egyptians had already been compelled to assume a single file formation before they reached 'Aruna. Third, the distance of 'Aruna from Megiddo is about half a day's march for an army, which we know from the Annals was not more than about seven or eight miles at the farthest.<sup>66</sup> We must assume that the Egyptians would push on as fast as possible through this mountain defile so as to free themselves from the danger of attack as soon as possible, but at the same time they would have been

62. On *mhrw* see Gardiner, *Admonitions*, p. 102-103

63. Lit. "passed by, crossed over".

64. This word, *mrw*, "waste, might perhaps refer to the source from which some of the troops were drawn. In that case they would be the auxiliary troops from the fringe of the desert. But if this surmise were correct, why are they mentioned before the regular troops, the *yw'yt* of the south and north?

65. Wiedemann, *Aegypt. Geschichte*, p. 347. Petrie *Hist., of Egypt* II, p. 325.

66. The distance from Tharu to Gaza is about 125 miles. This the Egyptians covered in nine days, making an average of fourteen miles a day.

hindered from making their best time by the confined nature of the road. Fourth, there must have been sufficient room and a sufficient water supply at 'Aruna to allow of the Egyptian army having camped there one night. These conditions are all satisfied by the location of 'Ar'arah. For, first, it occupies the most prominent position in the pass, just at the junction of the road to Tell el-Aghbariyeh with that to Megiddo and is surrounded with sufficient cultivable land to support a fair sized population. Second, it lies well within the pass, being about two hours' journey from the mouth. Third, it is about seven or eight miles from Megiddo, just the maximum distance we would suppose the Egyptians to have travelled between 'Aruna and Megiddo. Fourth, it is abundantly supplied with water, and is located in an opening in the wady large enough to accommodate a considerable body of troops (see View II). From these considerations it seems reasonably certain that 'Aruna must have lain somewhere near the site of the village 'Ar'arah. Etymologically, however, it seems hardly possible to equate 'Aruna ('-rw-n') with 'Ar'arah (عرة).

If we are right in this identification of 'Aruna with the modern 'Ar'arah, then shortly after leaving Yehem the host would have entered the mouth of the Wady 'Ârah and would have found itself in the situation which the officers of the army dreaded so much, where it was impossible to maintain any other than a long-drawn-out line of march. With this necessity of the topography the account in the Annals entirely agrees, for upon leaving Yehem, the Egyptians are said to have marched, at once, "horse behind horse", in the single file formation that the narrow valley demanded. It is not to be supposed that even on the coast plain from Gaza to Yehem the army had marched in any other than column formation. In most parts of the valley also this formation could be more or less maintained. If, however, the enemy had attacked the army in the open plain, it would have been possible for the Egyptians to have formed in some sort of battle-array. In the mountain pass, on the other hand, the long, straggling column necessitated by the narrow road could not have been organized into any sort of formation. It is on this account that the record so strongly emphasizes the straggling line which the country necessitated.

On the thirteenth day of the month (May 12th) the Egyptians were at 'Aruna, that is, on the third day after they are recorded to have been

at Yehem. We are not to suppose that it took three days to cover the distance between the two towns. If we are right in putting Yehem somewhere near the junction of the three roads across the Ridge, it would not have taken more than one day for the army to have reached 'Aruna. It is possible that the spies sent out to locate the enemy were not dispatched till after Yehem was reached, in which case it would have been necessary for the king to wait a day or two at Yehem for their return. It is not necessary to suppose that the council was called on the sixteenth. That date possibly indicates the time of arrival at the city, at which the king may have remained for several days. We must suppose that as soon as possible after the announcement of the king's decision to cross the Ridge directly to Megiddo, the advance was begun, for there would have been no object in delay, as far as our information goes. The nineteenth of the month was therefore occupied in the march to 'Aruna, at which place the Egyptians camped that night. Provided the location of Yehem as given above is in general correct, it would have been possible for the king to have pushed on further that night before camping. But in that case nightfall would, in all probability, have found the army still toiling through the pass, and they would have been compelled to halt so near to Megiddo that their camp would have been exposed to attack by the enemy had the latter been vigilant. Moreover, at 'Aruna there was a good camping-place (see page 10) with plenty of water, a favorable situation found nowhere else on the road. Furthermore, the distance from 'Aruna to Megiddo, as shown by the time occupied in crossing the pass the next day, was just about enough to allow the Pharaoh to get his entire army through the mountains in the course of the day and enable them to prepare for battle on the morrow.

In the passage of the mountains the king led the way accompanied by, or, in the words of the Annals, "bearing" his father, Amon. This is the only instance I know of in Egyptian records where we are told that statues or images of the gods were carried into battle, as the Hebrews carried the ark. The image of Amon in its portable shrine, born on the shoulders of a body of priests, undoubtedly accompanied the van of the army where was the king's chariot and "opened the way" before his Majesty. On the walls at Medinet Habu is a relief depicting the de-

parture of Ramses III for the first Lybian campaign.<sup>67</sup> Before the king is a chariot bearing the standard of Amon, a ram's head surmounted by the sun-disk, the whole supported on a pole attached to the chariot (see Fig. 1). Above the chariot is an inscription which reads: "Utterance of Amon-Re, king of gods: 'Lo, I am before thee, lord of the Two Lands, Usermare-Meriamon. I give [to thee] all [might and power] among the Nine Bows; terror.....their chiefs, I will *open* [for] thee the ways of the land of Temeh. I will trample them before thy horses.'"<sup>68</sup> It is interesting that this phrase "open the ways", so common in the inscriptions, should be so graphically illustrated by the



Figure 1. From Gressmann, *Altorientalische Texte und Bilder*, II, p. 34.

chariot of Amon preceding the king along the road to Lybia. Is it not more than likely that in Thutmose's inscription, where the king is said to be carrying his father Amon who in turn "opens the way" before him, we have just such another scene as that shown at Medinet Habu. We know of instances where portable cult images were carried

67. Champollion, *Monuments*, 217. Rosellini, *Monumenti Storici*, 124.

68. Breasted, *Ancient Records*, IV, 49.

far from Egypt, such as the image of Khonsu which was sent to the land of the Hittites by Ramses II,<sup>69</sup> or the image of Amon-of-the-Way that Wenamon carried to the king of Byblos.<sup>70</sup> The divine names given to the four divisions of Ramses II's army on the campaign of Kadesh<sup>71</sup> suggest that perhaps each division of the army bore an image of the deity under whose special protection it marched. Thutmose III, who owed his elevation to the throne to the intervention of Amon, might well emphasize the presence of the deity at the head of the expedition which was being carried on ostensibly at the god's command.

The fragmentary condition of lines 61-71 makes it impossible to determine clearly the connection between the portions of the text that still survive. It is evident, however, that with the words, "*pr-t yn h m-f'*", that is, "His Majesty went forth", in line 61, the Egyptians had reached the mouth of the pass and were about to make their exit into the open plain by the Kina. The "going-forth" was undoubtedly from the narrow mountain defile. As the mouth of the valley was reached, the Egyptian vanguard formed in battle-line, ready to resist any attack by the Asiatics and to cover the main body of the army still pushing through the mountains behind.<sup>72</sup>

On thus issuing from the mountains the king, to judge from the remaining fragments of the inscription, called out to his troops as he described the Asiatics across the Kina. The few words, "They are fallen. Now this wretched enemy", suggest such an interpretation and, the second

69. *op. cit.*, III, 429 ff.

70. *op. cit.*, IV, 557 ff.

71. *op. cit.*, III, 310 ff.

72. Until the appearance of the Urkunden there was no certainty as to who "went forth". Maspero has supplied a *hm*-sign after *pr-t yn*, but, at best, it was a restoration. Owing to the fact that the statement which immediately follows undoubtedly refers to the disposition of the Asiatic forces, Breasted, *Ancient Records* II, 426, interpreted the words *pr-t yn* as applying to the Asiatics. He therefore concluded that there had been an engagement in the mountains between the Egyptians and the Allies. Hall, *Anc. Hist. of the Near East*, p. 237, says "The people of the village of Aruna \* \* \* \* \* attacked the troops on the next day, and caused considerable annoyance to the rearguard, which was fighting near Aruna while the king with the van had crossed the head of the pass without resistance and was descending the slope of the Ruhah towards Megiddo." Since the publication of the Urkunden, Maspero's restoration is seen to have been correct, for Sethe has found on the walls at Karnak the traces of a *hm*-sign, showing that it was the king, not the Allies, that went forth in battle-array. Therefore Breasted's battle in the mountains must be given up. Hall's statement in regard to the rearguard fighting while the van was already across the mountains is not at all supported by the inscriptions, which make no mention of any such situation. In fact, all through this section of the Annals the fear of the Egyptians is constantly that just the opposite will occur and that the van will be fighting while the rear are still in 'Aruna without having fought.

person plural pronominal suffix preserved in line 69 would indicate that the words were addressed to those about the speaker. The object of what was said seems to have been to encourage the troops and perhaps to point out the successful accomplishment of the royal plan which the officers had opposed at Yehem.

After the words "numerous battle-array" Sethe would supply "*n gmn-f hry w'*", that is, "not did he find a single enemy",<sup>73</sup> all of which sentence is pure restoration except the word translated "single". Despite the fact that the restoration seems exactly to fill the lacuna, there is far too little ground for assuming that those particular words are what occupied the break. For historical purposes restorations which do not materially modify the meaning of a passage may be accepted with reserve even on comparatively slight evidence, but to add the statement of a fact of such historical importance as the denial of any conflict with the enemy in a place where such a conflict would naturally be expected, and that merely on the strength of a single word which does not in itself contain any clue to the nature of the lost passage, is too great a liberty with the text to be accepted, even if the restoration does just fill the lacuna. The fact that there is no mention of a meeting with the enemy, as far as the surviving portions of the text go, does not warrant the insertion of a denial of such an encounter. The best that we can do with this passage is to say that we do not know what occupied the lacuna.

The statement that "The southern wing (lit. "horn") was at Taanach while the northern wing was at the corner....." can refer only to the disposition of the Asiatic force, as Breasted has pointed out.<sup>74</sup> It is obvious that the enemy had miscalculated the movements of the Egyptian army and expected them to advance by the road around the southern end of the Ridge and so to approach Megiddo from the direction of Taanach. The Annalist is evidently describing the Asiatic lines as extending from Taanach on the south to "the corner....." on the north. Sethe's restoration here, "the corner of the valley of the Kina", though still only a surmise, is possible, for we can hardly believe that the Asiatics would have left Megiddo entirely undefended, and if one end of their

73. *Urk.* IV, 653.

74. *Ancient Records*, II, 426, note d.



line reached to the valley of the Kina, which flows by Megiddo, they would thus be in some position to defend the city. On this hypothesis we must suppose that the main body was somewhere on the road between Taanach and Megiddo with its probably detached extremities at either city, these outposts being the "wings" of the Annalist. They were thus prepared to mass their forces at either point according as the Egyptians advanced by Taanach or by the 'Aruna road direct to Megiddo. Still it is astonishing how little military wisdom the Asiatics seem to have displayed throughout this whole campaign. They took no advantage apparently of the opportunity for harassing the Egyptians offered by the narrow mountain pass. In fact, as far as we can see, they were unaware of which road Thutmose had chosen, until the Egyptians were almost at Megiddo. It seems to me that we must reach this conclusion if we suppose that they allowed the Egyptians to cross the mountains without attacking them in the narrow defile. At no time throughout the campaign were their chances of successful resistance to the invader so bright as when the Egyptian force was winding about among the hills, and this great opportunity they seem deliberately to have neglected. However, when our sources are so meagre and are also written from the enemy's standpoint, we cannot be positive on such a point.

The Annalist informs us that when the vanguard of the Egyptians had reached the opening of the pass, the rearguard was still far behind on the other side of the Ridge at 'Aruna, the point from which the army had set out in the morning. The officers who accompanied the king at the head of the army must have watched the opening of the valley with anxious eyes to catch a glimpse of the whereabouts of the enemy and to make sure that their fears, as expressed at the council at Yehem, were not about to be realized. As the army turned the last bend of the road, several hundred yards before it enters upon the plain, they found that the valley spread out to a couple of hundred yards in width while the slopes of the hills rose gently on either hand. The eager troops behind, pushing rapidly forward, not only to see what lay ahead, but also, no doubt, to free themselves from the dangerous position in which the narrowness of the pass placed them, soon filled the mouth of the valley (see View IV) and, we must suppose, in the case of the infantry, even

the slopes of the hills. What they saw before them was the wide expanse of level land, probably covered with ripening harvests, stretching for half a mile to the banks of the Kina, and beyond, about a mile away, the walls of Megiddo, the stronghold of the enemy and their own objective (see View V). And beyond the city lay the fertile plain of Esdraelon, with its grain fields and orchards, extending away to the blue hills of Galilee. No doubt between the Egyptians and the open plain was the northern wing of the Asiatic army, now probably in great commotion as they realized that their enemy had done the thing they had not calculated on and had surprised them with the bulk of their force far down the road towards Taanach. And no doubt in the Egyptian ranks many an officer and private looked with longing eyes at the open spaces of the great plain between which and themselves lay the enemy, and thought with fear of the long, straggling line of troops hastening over the hills at the mercy of any strong force which might swoop down on them from the heights on either hand.

At this point the officers plucked up courage to make one further request of the king. "Let our victorious lord harken to us this time", they said, even though he had seen fit to disregard their advice at Yehem. They then called Thutmose's attention to the troops behind him, who were gradually filling the mouth of the valley, as one by one the companies of infantry and "squadrons" of chariotry filed out of the narrow road and took up their positions in the rear of the waiting vanguard. They urged the king to wait at the mouth of the pass till all his troops had arrived, so that when the army finally emerged into the open, they might give all their attention to the enemy in front and might not have to weaken their strength by being compelled to detach a portion of their force to cover the arrival of the straggling rear. Now that Thutmose had actually reached Megiddo and had shown the feasibility of his own plan of campaign, he seems to have consented willingly to their suggestion, also, no doubt, realizing the wisdom of not dividing his army in the face of the enemy. By stationing a sufficient force on the hills on either side of the mouth of the valley, he could command a strong position. On his left was a long ridge, (marked D on Map II) two or three hundred feet high, which sloped down on the south into the valley in which the army then stood, and on the north was protected by the wide opening

of Wady es-Sitt (see View X). On the south of the valley-mouth was another equally high hill (marked E on Map II) which, though bounded by a more shallow wady on the other side, could still be held against the attack of a large force. With these two heights in his possession, and we cannot suppose that he failed to seize them at once, and with his vanguard, undoubtedly composed of picked troops, facing the enemy in front, he might feel reasonably safe from any attack by his foes until the rearguard had finally made its passage of the mountains. By gradually advancing his front into the open but still keeping the mouth of the valley well covered, he could make room for the fresh arrivals as they came up, until, when all had safely crossed, he could advance boldly with all his force into the fields bordering on the Kina.

At this point in his narrative the Annalist furnishes us with a most interesting datum. He says: "Now when the rear of the expedition was setting out upon this road, the shadow turned; and his Majesty arrived at the south of Megiddo on the bank of the brook Kina, when it was seven hours from the turning (measured) by the sun." So far as I know this is the only instance in the Egyptian records where an event is timed, as we to-day would time it, by the hours of the day. Taking this passage in conjunction with Borchardt's study of Egyptian sun-clocks,<sup>75</sup> we are able to ascertain the time of the king's arrival at his camping-place down to the very hour of the day. Borchardt's article is based on the study of the remains of two such clocks, one of which bears the inscription: "Living Horus, Mighty Bull Shining in Thebes, the Beloved of the Two Goddesses, etc. etc., King of Upper and Lower Egypt, Menkheperre (Thutmose III). Son of Re, . . . . .", showing that in the reign of Thutmose III such instruments for measuring time by the sun's shadow were already in use. According to Borchardt's reconstruction (see Fig. II) the instrument was placed so that the transverse piece A-B lay in a north-south direction, while the longitudinal section C-D would then extend in an east-west line. The shadow cast by A-B on C-D would gradually shorten as the sun rose, until at noon time, when the sun stood directly over head, there would be no shadow upon C-D at all. The longitudinal section was divided into six parts to correspond to the six hours of the morning, and as the shadow cast by A-B retreated from

75. Borchardt, "Altägyptische Sonnenuhren", *AZ*, 48 (1911), p. 9 ff.

one of these parts to another the observer could ascertain with tolerable exactness the time of day. To tell the afternoon hours it was necessary to reverse the instrument so that it would face the west, and the progress of the hours would then be indicated by the lengthening of the shadow cast by the transverse A-B upon C-D.

This brief summary of Borchardt's reconstruction of the working of Egyptian sun-clocks gives us the data necessary for the understanding of the Annalist's statement that the shadow turned. Obviously by this




Figure II. From *Zeitschrift für ägyptische Sprache*, 48 (1911), Tafel 2.

phrase he referred to the time at which the shadow, instead of withdrawing towards C, turned around, as it were, and began to lengthen out towards D after the reversal of the clock. The turning of the shadow would then indicate noon, the hours before the shadow turned belonging to the morning, and those after the shadow turned to the afternoon. The turning of the shadow cannot very well apply to sunrise, and so many hours after the turning would therefore not refer to the morning hours. To speak of the shadow turning instead of the clock being turned would be no more inconsistent than are many of the terms in popular use to-day, as when we speak of the sun going down, etc. It is evident that the rearguard of the Egyptians left 'Aruna at noon or shortly after, that is, when the shadow turned, and that the king reached the banks of the Kina at seven o'clock in the evening, that is, seven hours from the turning (measured) by the sun. If the king waited at the opening of the valley for the arrival of the rearguard and then at once moved forward to

the night's camping-place, it would seem that it took the rearguard seven hours to cross the Ridge, about the time that we would expect to be consumed in the passage by troops encumbered with camp furniture and all the motley array that accompanies an army on the march. If, therefore, it took the rearguard seven hours to march from 'Aruna to Megiddo, we must suppose that the van had consumed much the same time in covering the same distance. As the king was at the mouth of the valley at least by noon, for the rearguard which left 'Aruna at noon did not leave till after the van had crossed the Ridge, he must have started from 'Aruna at least by five o'clock in the morning, the whole day being thus consumed in the passage. In Palestine in the month of May it would still be bright daylight at seven in the evening and the army would therefore have reached its camping-place well before dark.<sup>76</sup>

The spot chosen for the Egyptian camp was most certainly the expanse of level ground extending along the south bank of the Kina (see View VII). A more suitable location could not have been chosen. Here was an ample stretch of flat land just at the opening of the pass (see Map III). By camping here the army secured its line of communication with the south by which it had just come from the other side of the Ridge. Besides, the wady of the Kina served as a defence on the two sides most exposed to attack from the direction of Megiddo. The stream furnished abundant water for both men and animals. Moreover, if the Egyptians posted a force on the knoll F, they would be able to prevent attacks from the east during the night. It is obvious that the army did not move out into the open Plain of Esdraelon, for to do so they would have been obliged to pass through the forces of the enemy who held the road to Taanach and, had they succeeded in doing so, they would have been cut off from their line of communication over the Ridge. Furthermore,

76. All the current histories have interpreted this passage to mean that the army completed the crossing of the mountains by about one in the afternoon taking "seven hours from the turning" to mean seven hours from sunrise. This interpretation, aside from the fact that the "turning" seems to have little meaning when applied to sunrise, would be difficult of acceptance, owing to the facts of the physical situation. That an army of 10,000 to 15,000 men, with all the camp furniture of an army on a campaign far away from home, and a large part of whose force consisted of chariots, could traverse a narrow mountain defile eight to nine miles long between sunrise and one o'clock in the afternoon is almost inconceivable. An army, strung out in almost single file, from the time the van left 'Aruna till the rear reached the mouth of the valley by Megiddo, would certainly have consumed the best part of a day.

the Annals would seem to indicate that the bank of the Kina south of Megiddo, at which place the army arrived at seven in the evening, was the spot where the camp was pitched. Any location on the bank of the brook out in the open plain would not have been south, but east or north, of Megiddo, and throughout the Annals the writer is quite accurate in the indication of direction. Also the location of the camp at this spot falls in well with the operations in the next day's battle.

Our knowledge of the appearance of an Egyptian camp is largely drawn from the battle reliefs of Ramses II.<sup>77</sup> These have been so frequently and so fully described that it is not necessary to enter into a discussion of the subject here, especially as it does not bear directly on the problem before us. Suffice it to say that, if we may trust the reliefs, Ramses' camp was bounded by the shields of the troops set up on end so as to inclose a large rectangular piece of ground. In the center of this inclosure stood the royal tent, around which were camped the troops and camp-followers. Such in general we may suppose to have been the arrangement of Thutmose's bivouack by the Kina. The Annalist gives us a glimpse into the routine activities of the camp that shows us how orderly war had already become even in this remote age. First of all orders were issued to the troops to prepare themselves and their weapons for the morrow's conflict, and we may picture to ourselves the busy scenes as bowstrings were tested, arrows, spears and knives sharpened, chariot wheels examined, and all the military accoutrement put in order. The king withdrew to his tent, doubtless to consult with his officers and decide upon the plan of action to be followed in the morning as based on the topography of the immediate environs of Megiddo. Some such consultation must have taken place, for it is evident that the next day's conflict was no haphazard engagement but a well-ordered and well-generated battle with all the physical features of the region taken into consideration. The phrase which I have translated, "The officers were provided for" may possibly refer to the issuance of these orders to the various officers of the army. The words "*wḥ' n šmšw*" are quite obscure, but would seem to refer to the distribution of rations to the troops or court. Then follows the statement that the watch made its rounds and that the royal guard, "the watch in life", was stationed at the royal

<sup>77</sup> Lepsius, *Denkmäler*, III, 154, 155. Breasted, *Battle of Kadesh*, Plate I.

tent. Then, when all these preparations had been carried out, report was made at headquarters, to put it in modern terms, that "all's well". The army had settled down to rest before the arduous duties of the next day.

Of what was going on across the Kina among the Asiatics the Annalist has told us nothing. We can only surmise the movements of the enemy. That they were taken by surprise is evident from what has gone before. They had apparently made their preparations for meeting Thutmose in the direction of Taanach,<sup>78</sup> and when they discovered that he had taken them in the rear, their consternation must have been great. As, however, Thutmose did not advance from the mouth of the pass for some five hours or more after the Egyptian vanguard had accomplished the crossing, the Asiatics would have had abundant time to recall their main body from the direction of Taanach, only about four or five miles away, and to prepare to meet the Egyptian advance on the following day.

The Asiatics would undoubtedly have pitched their camp so as to place it between the Egyptians and the city (see Map III). No more favorable location for a camp could have been found than the almost level top of the mound G just south of Megiddo (see View VI). It is an elevated piece of ground that could therefore be more easily defended than a lower situation, while by choosing this spot the Asiatics could protect the city on its weakest side where the wall was lowest and most accessible. We must also suppose the camp to have been located at about this spot, rather than on the lower land to the west, north or east of the city, for on the next day when the center and right of the Egyptians closed in from the west and south of the city, they seem to have charged directly through the camp of the Allies. To have made this possible the camp must have been located at about the spot indicated above. As to what went on in the Asiatic quarters that night, the Annalist has given us no information and it is useless to speculate on such a subject.

<sup>78</sup>. At any rate it seems evident that, of the three roads across the Ridge, the Zefiti road did not enter seriously into the calculations of the Asiatics, for they apparently so disposed their forces as to enable them to concentrate their troops near the mouth either of the 'Aruna road or of the road by Taanach. Had they anticipated an attack from the Zefiti road, they would most probably have advanced a portion of their force along the road north of Megiddo, a movement which does not seem to have been undertaken at all.

## IV

## THE BATTLE OF MEGIDDO

## THE ANNALS, LINES 84-90

Urk. 657 Year 23, first month of the third season, day 21; day of the feast of the new moon as usual. The king appeared early in the morning. Then orders were issued to the entire army to cross [the valley of the Kina.]<sup>79</sup> (85) His Majesty proceeded in a chariot of electrum, clad in his accoutrements of war, like Horus the Valiant, Lord of Offerings, like Montu of Thebes. His father Amon was strengthening his limbs. The south wing of the army of his Majesty was at a hill south of.....Kina, and the north wing was at the north-west of Megiddo, his Majesty occupying the center. Amon was the protection of his members. The power of the might of [Set was the strength] (86) of his limbs.

Then his Majesty prevailed against them at the head of his Urk. 658 troops; (and when) they saw that his Majesty prevailed against them, they fled headlong [to] Megiddo with faces of fear. They abandoned their horses and their chariots of gold and of silver. They drew them [up] by hoisting with their garments into this city. Now the people had shut up this city against them [and they let down] (87) garments to hoist them upward into this city.

Now had the troops of his Majesty only not given their hearts to plunder the possessions of the enemy, they would [have plundered] Megiddo at this moment, while the wretched enemy of Kadesh and the wretched enemy of this city were

79. The restoration "valley of the Kina" (*yn-t ꜥy-n'*) would seem just to fill the lacuna as given in the Urkunden, and would also agree with the actual situation as developed in the discussion above.



drawn (up) to secure their entrance into their city, the fear of his Majesty having entered (88) [into their limbs.] Their arms were weak. His serpent diadem had prevailed against them.

Urk. 659 Then were captured their horses and chariots of gold and silver, made an easy [spoil.] Their battle-array was lying stretched out like fishes in a [corner.]<sup>80</sup> The victorious troops of his Majesty went around counting their respective portions. Then was captured the tent of [that] wretched [enemy,] which was worked<sup>81</sup> [with (89) silver].....The entire army was rejoicing and giving praise to Amon [for the victory] which he had given to his son on [this day. They gave praise] to his Majesty, exalting his victory, They brought up the spoil they had taken, consisting of hands, of living prisoners, of Urk. 660 horses and chariots of gold and silver and of painted stuff.

(90).. .....His Majesty commanded his army, saying, "Capture ye.....victory. Behold, [every land] is given [to my Majesty according to the command] of Re this day; for every chief of every [north]ern country which has revolted is within it; for it is the capture of a thousand cities, the capture of Megiddo. Capture ye, capture ye, thoroughly!"

At this point it is necessary to determine from just what direction the attack upon the Asiatic lines was delivered on the following day. Our data for reaching a conclusion on this subject are woefully meagre and leave us at the last not quite satisfied. Only two statements are made in the Annals in regard to the location of the Egyptian lines. First, "Then orders were issued to the entire army to cross [the valley of the Kina]", and, second, "The south wing of the army of his Majesty was at a hill south of.....Kina and the north wing was at the northwest of Megiddo, his Majesty occupying the center." One other fact may be added to this scanty information, namely, that the Asiatic

80. Or as Sethe divides the text, "like fishes in a round corner". I have followed Breasted's arrangement (*Ancient Records*, II, 431) and have construed *iny* with what follows rather than with what goes before. In any case the passage is obscure.

81. Generally heretofore the hieroglyphic figure of a bird at this place has been read as a *s'*-sign, on which reading was based the statement that the captured tent contained the son of the king of Kadesh, who thus fell into Thutmose's hands. Sethe, however, reads on the stone a *b'*-sign and so restored *byk*, "worked, wrought," which reading I have here followed.

camp most certainly lay between the Egyptian army and the city, for, as has been already pointed out, the Egyptians, in pursuing the Asiatics fleeing into the city after the battle, came upon the latter's camp and stopped to plunder it. The camp, therefore, very likely lay almost opposite the Egyptian center, so that the troops converging on the city all fell to plundering the possessions of the enemy. Had the camp lain to one side, it is likely that at least a part of the army would have continued the pursuit of the fleeing foe up to the city walls. On these few facts and this one deduction must rest the decision as to the direction from which the Egyptian attack was made.

"The northwest of Megiddo" and "the hill south of.....Kina" mark the two extremities of the Egyptian lines. "The former must refer to the strip of cultivated land between the Tell and the hill A (see Map II), that is, at or near the northern end of this strip of land where it opens into the plain of Esdrælon (see View IX). The "hill south of .....Kina" is undoubtedly the knoll F. Being a detached eminence it would easily serve as a defensible termination to a line of battle. By occupying this rise the Pharaoh could protect the southern wing of his army and until it moved forward away from the knoll, could prevent the enemy from turning his right flank. Either C or D, the other two hills which might be considered south of the Kina, are so much in line with the hills on either side of them that they would hardly serve as a natural defence upon which to rest one wing of the army. Nor do they stand out prominently enough to serve as a distinctive designation of location. Moreover, as the steepness of the bank of the Kina where it skirts the south side of the mound H, is too great to allow of troops making an effective attack on H from that direction, the right or south wing of the Egyptian force must have been compelled to move round mound H to the east to attack the Asiatic south wing. If, therefore, the southern extremity of the Egyptian line rested on knoll F before the battle, the Pharaoh's troops would have been in a position to advance directly against the enemy defending the east side of the group of mounds (see Map IV).

If, therefore, we take the knoll F as the "Hill south of.....Kina", we must then decide whether the Egyptian line of battle faced the city from the west and south of Megiddo or from the open plain to the north

and east, In either case it would be possible to station the troops so that one wing would be to the northwest of the city and the other wing would rest on the knoll F. Had the Annalist but seem fit to designate the wings of the army as right and left, we would then be able to locate the Pharaoh's line of battle exactly, but as he speaks of them merely as the north wing and the south wing, we are left to solve our problem in accordances, with what seems to agree best with all the known circumstances, especially with the topography.

The statement that "orders were issued to the entire army to cross [the Valley of the Kina]" does not throw any light on this aspect of the problem. Whether the army was drawn up to the west and south or to the north and east of the city, it would have been necessary for the bulk of the troops to cross the Kina before taking up their position. We can therefore eliminate this datum from the determining factors of the situation.

That the Egyptian line of battle was drawn up on the north and east of the city seems highly improbable for the following reasons. First, as we have seen, the Pharaoh's camp on the night before the battle must have lain in the open stretch of land between the Kina and the mouth of the valley through which the 'Aruna road ran. To have advanced into the open plain would have cut him off from his line of communication with the south and, in case of defeat, would have exposed his army to almost certain destruction as it would have cut off the way of retreat. Second, in advancing into the plain Thutmose would have exposed his force to a flank attack from the direction of Megiddo, much more than would have been the case had he moved out to the west and south of the city. Third, as the Asiatic camp lay between the Pharaoh's battle-line and Megiddo, we must suppose that the camp was situated to the northeast of the city and therefore that the Asiatics had failed to place themselves between the city and the Egyptians on the previous night. Fourth, if the Allies' camp was so situated to the northeast of the city, then it would have been necessary for the Egyptians to make a wide detour in the Plain in order to take up their station previous to the battle, and in so doing they would have exposed themselves, when at a great disadvantage, to the attack of the enemy. Fifth, if the Asiatic camp lay to the northeast of Megiddo, the Asiatic army would, of

course, have been drawn up to the north and east of their camp. The Egyptian army, therefore, in taking up their position to the north and east of the Allies, but with the wings of their army resting on the hill A and the knoll F, would have been strung out in a most remarkable formation. At best their line would have been very thin and would have formed roughly at least 270° of a huge circle with the Asiatic camp and army well in the center of the circle. That the Pharaoh would have attempted to assume any such extraordinary formation is as difficult to conceive as it is difficult to suppose that the Asiatics would have stood quietly by and either have allowed themselves to be so surrounded or not have taken advantage of the opportunity afforded by the enemy's extended and weakened line to cut it in two in the center and roll the shattered portions back upon the wings. Taking all these circumstances into consideration, it seems certain that we can dismiss any idea of the king's having drawn up his lines to the north and east of the city.

Turning to the alternative position, that to the west and south of Megiddo, we find the following considerations in favor of Thutmose's having chosen that side of the city for his attack. First, he would be able thereby to secure his line of retreat back over the 'Aruna road to the south. Second, he would not have to expose the bulk of his army to a flank attack while taking up his position. Third, such a location would allow of our placing the Asiatic camp on the mound G, between the city and the Egyptian encampment, the place where we would naturally expect it to be located. Fourth, the Egyptian lines would not have been drawn out so far but that they could have been compact enough to have made them an effective attacking force. Their length would have been only about half that necessary had they taken up the other position to the north and east of Megiddo. Considering the whole situation, it would appear certain that Thutmose's army was drawn up to the west and south of the city in the semicircle of cultivated land between the hills A, B, C, D, and E and the mounds G, H, and I.

On the morning of the battle, the twenty-first day of the first month of the third season (May 15, 1479), the signal for the commencement of hostilities seems to have been the appearance of the king from the royal tent. At once the order was issued, as the Annals has it, "to the entire army to cross [the valley of the Kina]" As the Egyptian camp most

certainly stood on the south of the Kina on the flat land between the brook and the hills D and E, the words lost in the lacuna must have referred to the depression through which the brook flowed. There is no other feature of the topography of which the word "cross" could well be used. It seems safe, therefore, to proceed on the assumption that the royal command was to cross the Kina. That the words "entire army" are to be taken literally is impossible, if we are to accept the statement that the south wing of the Egyptian force was later at the "hill south of.....Kina". The lacuna in this instance must also have included some phrase applicable to the valley of the Kina. If the entire army had crossed the brook, the south wing could not well be said to be at the hill south of the brook, for the channel that the stream has cut is so marked a feature of the topography that we may be sure it, rather than the hill south of it, would have been mentioned had the brook intervened between the Egyptian south wing and the hill. When the Annalist speaks of the "entire army", he probably uses it in a loose sense to designate the large majority of the troops, including, as we shall see, the center and the north wing. Only on this interpretation of the words "the entire army" is it possible to reconcile these conflicting statements.<sup>82</sup>

82. In the current histories the most detailed accounts of the position of the Egyptian troops are given by Maspero, Budge, Breasted and Hall as follows: Maspero, *Struggle of the Nations*, p. 258, "By dawn the next day the whole army was in motion. It was formed into a single line, the right wing protected by the torrent, the left extended into the plain, stretching beyond Megiddo towards the north-west." Budge, *Hist. of Egypt*, IV, p. 33-34, "At daybreak on the 21st the whole army marched out in single formation, its right wing resting on the river and its left reaching to Megiddo on its north-western side." Breasted, *Hist. of Egypt*, p. 289, "Late in the afternoon of the same day (the fourteenth) or during the ensuing night, Thutmose took advantage of the enemy's position on the east and south-east of his own force to draw his own line around the west side of Megiddo and boldly threw out his left wing on the northwest of the city. He thus secured, in case of necessity, a safe and easy line of retreat westward along the Zeffi road, while at the same time his extreme left might cut off the enemy from flight northward." Hall, *Anc. Hist. of the Near East*, p. 238, "The Egyptians who advanced in line, pivoting on their right wing, which remained upon the spur of hill above el-Lejjâ and south of the brook Kina, until the left wing had swung around to the north-east of Megiddo itself." All these interpretations agree in general and also, to a large extent, fit in with the local topography. In some points, however, they are open to criticism. Both Maspero and Budge state that the right wing rested on the River Kina, whereas the Annalist states that it rested on "a hill south of.....Kina", which certainly cannot be interpreted to mean the river itself. Also the Annals give no support to Budge's phrase, "in single formation." Breasted suggests that the Egyptians took up their position "late on the same day (the day of crossing the mountains) or during the ensuing night." However, he interpreted differently the phrase which I have translated "the king appeared early in the morning." The latter translation would preclude the idea of the Egyptians having taken up their position before the morning of the battle. Hall's statement that the Egyptian army *pivoted* on their right wing, which remained on a spur of hill above el-Lejjâ (*sic*) is difficult to understand in the face of the configuration of the country, for it would seem to necessitate the crossing of the low limestone hills around Megiddo by

In order to reach the north bank of the Kina, the Egyptian force would have to cross the stream at or near the point "a" at the opening of the Wady es-Sitt. This would have been necessitated by the depth of the channel that the stream has cut across the flat cultivated land. As has already been pointed out, this channel is some fifteen or twenty feet deep at "b", while at "a" it is only two or three feet deep. As there was a body of Egyptian chariotry with the center of the army, it would be necessary for them to find some point at which the crossing could be easily made, and such a point is found anywhere along the course of the stream south of "a". That all the chariots in the Egyptian ranks were with that portion of the army north of the Kina is certain, for the banks of the stream between "b" and the place where the brook crosses the Taanach road at "c" are so steep, in places being practically perpendicular, as to preclude all idea of chariots crossing the stream between those points, especially in the face of an enemy, as would have been necessary had the chariots advanced towards the city from the south of the Kina.

As the Egyptians were the attacking force, their formation and position would necessarily be determined to a great extent by the location and disposition of the Asiatic army. It will therefore be necessary to consider the position of the Allies before proceeding further with the discussion of the Egyptian lines of battle. With their camp pitched on mound G there would be but one formation natural for the Allies to assume. It is hardly conceivable that they would have foregone the advantage to be derived from the elevated position of the mounds. We must suppose that their lines were drawn up around the edge of mounds G, H and I. By this formation they would have had the natural defence against the onslaught of the Egyptians that the sloping sides of the mounds afforded and, in the case of the south wing, the channel of the Kina also (see Map IV). That there was a strong body of chariots with the Allies is certain, not only from the fact that the chariot as an instrument of warfare was in use in Asia before it was known in Egypt, but also from the fact that among the spoil taken from Megiddo after the

the chariots in the center of the Egyptian lines, an impossible feat. All these accounts, however, agree that the attack on Megiddo was delivered from the south and west of the city and not from the side of the plain, though in one or two instances the accompanying maps do not so place the battle-field.

battle were 924 chariots and 2,238 horses of all kinds. We need not suppose that all of them were present in the battle. Undoubtedly many of them were taken during the course of the later siege and some may have come from surrounding towns, the spoil from which has apparently been included in that from Megiddo in the lists of booty. This is by far the largest number of chariots recorded as having been taken in any battle during Thutmose's campaigns. The only other three instances in which the numbers have survived give us 13 chariots from *I-n-r-t*<sup>83</sup> on the seventh campaign, 15 from the district of Nuges<sup>84</sup> on the ninth campaign, and 60 from *I-r-y-n* and Naharin<sup>85</sup> on the tenth campaign. But as in other respects the numbers in the lists of booty from Megiddo are far in excess of those recording the spoil from the later campaigns, we must suppose that the forces put into the field by the Allies at Megiddo were larger than the Egyptians encountered in any of the subsequent campaigns where they were dealing with more or less isolated states instead of with a wide spread and powerful coalition.

As has already been said, it is not probable that all the chariots and horses which figure in the lists of booty from Megiddo were actually present in this battle. There must have been a sufficient number present, however, to have constituted a considerable portion of the Asiatic strength. It is necessary, therefore, in determining the position of the allied troops to take this body of chariots into consideration. If we are right in placing the Egyptian lines in a semicircle along the strip of cultivated land between the foothills and the mounds on which the Asiatics were camped, that consideration alone would lead us to conclude that the enemy was drawn up in roughly similar formation opposite them. When we examine the topography of the battle-field, we see at once that such a formation is exactly that which an army occupying the mounds G and H, and possibly I, would be likely to assume. By arranging their lines along the top of the slopes on the west and south of the mounds G, H and I, the Asiatics would be able to secure what advantage was to be derived from forcing their opponents to attack them while charging up hill. Moreover, should they themselves charge

83. *Urk.* IV, 691.

84. *Urk.* IV, 704.

85. *Urk.* IV, 711.

forward against the Egyptians, they would have the advantage of advancing down hill, as did the Greeks at Marathon. If we consider it likely that the Allies would thus accommodate themselves to the topography of the country, there can then be only one location where they could conceivably have placed their chariotry. The northern part of the western slope of mound G is too steep to allow chariots to descend with any assurance that they would arrive at the bottom of the incline in an upright position. The same is true of the south and east side of mound H. However, between the northwest side of mound G and the south side of mound H the descent from the mounds to the cultivated land below is quite gradual, allowing a space about half a mile long down which chariots could advance with ease (see View XIII). It is at this point in the Asiatic lines, therefore, that we must locate their chariotry. It is there also, in the center of their force, that we would naturally expect them to mass their greatest strength, opposite the portion of the Egyptian army that Thutmose himself led in person.

With the Allies thus disposed, the location of the Egyptians becomes fairly certain. The north wing, which was to the northwest of Megiddo, was drawn up along the foot of the hill A with a portion of the Asiatic foot opposite it on the side of the mound G. The Egyptian center, probably composed largely of chariots, took up its position along the foot of the hills B and C opposite the Asiatic center, which was on the western edge of the mound H. Then the Egyptian south wing, where only foot-soldiers were practicable, probably held the ground occupied on the preceding evening by Thutmose's camp, the southern extremity of the wing resting on the knoll F.

When once the battle was joined, the chariots would charge at full speed upon the opposing ranks. At the word of command, therefore, we may suppose that the Egyptians advanced upon the mounds G, H and I from the west and south. Direct advance upon the south of mound H would be very difficult, as the banks of the Kina and the slope of the mound is steep at that point. We may therefore suppose that the Asiatics left only a small force to hold this position and placed their south wing on mound I, one extremity of the line being protected by the steep side of mound H and the other by the channel of the Kina. If the south wing of the Egyptians was composed of infantry, it would be pos-



sible for them to cross the Kina to the attack of the Asiatic south wing. When once this wing had been broken, the Egyptians could then attack the Asiatic main body in the rear with telling effect. It is possible that some such movement, rapidly executed, won the day for the Pharaoh.

Of the actual conflict which took place there is not a vestige of information. To judge from the Annalist's narrative it would seem that the Asiatics fled without striking a blow. "Then his Majesty prevailed against them at the head of his troops; and when they saw that his Majesty prevailed against them, they fled headlong to Megiddo with faces of fear. They abandoned their horses and their chariots of gold and of silver. They drew them up by hoisting with their garments into this city, for the people had shut up the city against them, and they let down garments to hoist them upwards into the city." That the Allies held their ground for any great length of time seems unlikely, if we are to trust the statement of the number of hands cut from the dead, only 83 being recorded among the spoil from Megiddo.<sup>86</sup> Although this figure may not represent the exact number of the slain, it is evident that the Asiatics fled after offering very little resistance. Why they did so is not plain. They probably mustered a considerable force and they certainly had the advantage of position. It is likely, however, that they had been hastily gathered together, many undoubtedly having been forced into the coalition against their will, as was sometimes the case among the Syro-Palestinian allies in the later period of the Assyrian invasions. It is possible that the Egyptian force proved to be larger than the Asiatics had expected to encounter. Moreover, the seat of the rebellion was in the north, and many of the Allies must have felt themselves far away from their home land and have lost interest in the conflict as they advanced towards the south. Perhaps the fact that the Pharaoh had out-

86. Only once more, on his last campaign, does Thutmose record the number of hands taken from the slain, they then amounting to only 29 (*Urk.* IV, 731). These figures from Thutmose's campaigns are the smallest, as far as I know, of any in the Egyptian royal annals. The number of hands recorded as taken from the slain in battle increase with the later inscriptions. In the time of the great war that Merneptah waged with the Lybians and their allies from among the northern invaders, we find at least 3,410 hands taken (Breasted, *Ancient Records*, III, 588), while in Ramses III's Lybian campaigns the figures run into the twelve thousands (Breasted, *op. cit.* IV, 54). Either the earlier wars were fought with far less numerous foes than in the time of the great invasions of the XIX and XX Dynasties, or the later accounts are greatly exaggerated, or the custom of cutting off the hands of the slain was much more commonly practised in later times than under the XVIII Dynasty, with whom the custom makes its first appearance.

manceuvred them would have upset any previously laid plans of the Allies. Whatever may have been the reason, the Asiatics fell back before the Egyptian advance and their rout was immediately complete.

The situation at the Battle of Megiddo was not unlike that which subsequently developed in the course of the action at Kadesh between Ramses II and the Hittites.<sup>87</sup> In the latter case the Egyptian camp lay along the bank of the Orontes and the Hittites, in attacking the camp, threw out their wings to either side and inclosed the Egyptian army, driving it back towards the river. In the battle of Megiddo the Egyptian army threw out its wings and inclosed the Asiatic army, driving it back through its camp to the city of Megiddo behind. At Kadesh the utter destruction of the Egyptian force was prevented by the fact that the Hittites stopped to plunder the Egyptian camp. The same event in the battle of Megiddo prevented the total destruction of the Allies. As Thutmose's army closed in on the Asiatic forces, the Egyptians in pursuing the fleeing foe, found it necessary to pass through the enemy's camp, and the rich plunder that lay everywhere around proved too much for their discipline. Forgetting the routed Asiatics, the Pharaoh's army set to looting the captured camp, thus affording the enemy the opportunity to effect their entrance into Megiddo or to flee to the north across the plain of Esdraelon. What might, therefore, have proved the total annihilation of the Asiatics, was turned into a mere defeat, though a severe one, and Thutmose found that the cupidity of his troops was to cost him still further efforts.

When the Asiatics turned to flee before the Egyptian onset, they found themselves confronted with a most dangerous situation. The inhabitants of the city, who must have been intently watching the struggle from the top of the wall, when once the magnitude of the disaster which had befallen their arms became apparent, lost all thought for the safety of the survivors and shut the gates of Megiddo in the faces of their troops fleeing to the city for safety. Few, if any, of the chariots of the Allies were saved. Had the conflict taken place in the open plain, many of the Asiatics could have made use of their chariots in effecting their escape across the plain. That, however, was impossible in the situation in which they found themselves. On the west, south, and southwest

<sup>87</sup> Breasted, *Battle of Kadesh*, p. 34.

were the advancing Egyptians, while to the north lay the city, its gates shut against friend and foe alike. Escape, except over the city wall, was possible only to the northeast, and to flee in that direction it was necessary for them to cross their camp and descend the steep sides of the mound G on the northeast, a decline too precipitate for horse and chariot, even had they been able to make their way through the debris scattered about the camp. As a result of this unforeseen situation, the Asiatics "abandoned their horses and their chariots of gold and of silver" and took to their heels for safety. This fact probably accounts for the large number of horses and chariots mentioned above as enumerated among the spoil of Megiddo. Many of the Allies must have escaped northward into the plain of Esdrælon and beyond, especially when they found the city gates closed against them. When once they had reached the plain, they would have been safe, for the Egyptians, as we saw, had abandoned the pursuit for the lure of plunder. Those who turned towards the city, among which number were the kings of Kadesh and Megiddo, were drawn up into the city by the inhabitants. The glacis, extending along the base of the wall, allowed the fugitives to get near enough to the top of the wall so that the inhabitants, by lowering the long girdles from their waists, could pull them up to the top. The Egyptian sense of humor is evident in the relish with which the Annalist describes the undignified escape of the kings, dangling at the ends of the lowered garments. Had the Egyptians pursued the Asiatics, they would undoubtedly have been able to inflict great loss upon the mass of disorganized fugitives, struggling for an opportunity to climb into the city. The absorption of the victors in the plundering of the camp could not be better illustrated than by the fact that the enemy were allowed the time necessary to effect their escape in this cumbersome fashion. It is likely that the royal fugitives did not long remain within the walls, for when Megiddo finally surrendered after a siege, they were not among the prisoners. Probably seeing the hopelessness of the situation, they lingered in the city only long enough to gather a few followers, and then escaped by the northern gate, still surviving,<sup>88</sup> just above the terrace-like projection on the north of the Tell.

Meanwhile the Egyptian army was gathering in a rich harvest of

88. Schumacher, *Tell el-Mutesellim*, II, plate 2.

spoil. Besides the chariots already spoken of, the hands cut from the bodies of the few Asiatics who had fallen in battle, totaling only 83, were gathered together as evidence of victory. Many of the enemy must have been made captive in the confusion of the rout and these too counted as spoil. One of the most conspicuous prizes, however, was the tent of the king of Kadesh, a sumptuous affair, supported by seven poles and worked, probably, with silver. It undoubtedly contained handsome furniture, a prize for that time as notable as was, at a later day, the famous tent of Darius captured by Alexander, the Great. All this booty seems to have been gathered together before the king. A large share of the spoil was made over to the treasury of Amon. Much must have gone to replenish the royal coffers. Some of it undoubtedly was given as rewards to those members of the army who had distinguished themselves in the engagement.

At this point an interesting supplement to the Annals is furnished by the biography of Amenemheb, one of Thutmose's generals, who accompanied the king on many of his campaigns, though whether he was present at Megiddo is uncertain. In relating his part in Thutmose's campaigns in Syria, he says:

When his Majesty came to Naharin, I brought off three men from the fight there; I set them before thy Majesty as living prisoners." "Again I fought on that expedition in the land of Carchemish. I brought off . . . as living prisoners. I set them before my lord. He rewarded me with a great reward." Again I beheld his victory in the country of Takhsi, the wretched, in the city of Mero . . . I brought off Asiatics, 3 men, as living prisoners. Then my lord gave to me the gold of honor; list thereof: 2 flies, a lion, a female slave and a male slave."<sup>89</sup>

The larger objects of spoil were thus brought up before the king, who undoubtedly indicated the share belonging to Amon, that designed for the royal treasury, and that to be divided among the army. In the days of Ahmose I it was the duty of the royal herald to present to the sovereign those of his commanders who had a claim on the royal favor because of conspicuous valor.<sup>90</sup> We may picture to ourselves a scene of barbaric splendor as the Pharaoh sat enthroned upon the battlefield, surrounded by his officers and troops, while Intef, the herald,<sup>91</sup> brought be-

89. Breasted, *Ancient Records*, II, 581 ff.

90. Breasted, *op. cit.* II, 9, 11.

91. Breasted, *op. cit.* II, 767 ff.

fore the king, one by one, the candidates for the sovereign's rewards. And much of the praise that the army is said to have given to the king probably arose from the acclamations of the soldiery as to one after another of their favorite officers Thutmose distributed the marks of his favor.

We cannot suppose, however, that much time was consumed in this wise. Thutmose realized that his work was only half done while Megiddo itself remained in the enemy's hands. He therefore urged on his army to continue the successful efforts they had begun, adding: "Behold, [every land] is given [to my Majesty according to the command] of Re this day; for every chief of every northern country which has revolted is within it; for it is the capture of a thousand cities, the capture of Megiddo." But apparently the great opportunity had been lost. The delay occasioned by the plundering of the camp had been sufficient to allow the leaders of the Allies to escape, and when finally the city fell, "every chiefs of every northern country" was no longer within it.

## V

## THE SIEGE OF MEGIDDO

## THE ANNALS, LINES 90-98

Behold,.....(91).....[officers] of the *mnft* to hasten.....[to cause that] every [man should know] his position. They measured [this] city, inclosing it with an earth-work, fenced about with the green wood of all their pleasant  
 Urk. 661 trees, while his Majesty himself was upon the fortress, south of this city, watching (92) [upon it day and night.] .....  
 .....inclosed.....with a thick wall.....with its thick wall. The name was called "Menkheperre-is-the-ensnarer-of-the-Asiatics". People were appointed to watch at the tent of his Majesty, to whom was said, "Steadfast! Steadfast! Watchful! watchful!" [Now] his Majesty (93).....  
 [It was not permitted that] one of them [go out] to the outside upon the back of this wall except to go out to knock (?) at the door of their fortress.

Now everything that his Majesty did to this city and to this wretched enemy together with his wretched army was recorded on the day by its name, by the name of the voyage, by the  
 Urk. 662 name of the officers of the (94) *mnft*.....  
 .....They were recorded upon a roll of leather in the temple of Amon on this day.

Now the chiefs of this country came upon their bellies to kiss the earth because of the might of his Majesty; to beg the breath for their nostrils, because great was his power and because great was the might of Amon over [every] foreign country. All the chiefs were brought because of the might of his Majesty, bearing their tribute of silver, gold, lapis-lazuli, mal-

akite, and carrying in clean grain, wine, cattle, small cattle, for the army of his Majesty.

Urk, 663 One gang of them was bearing tribute southward. Then his Majesty appointed anew the chiefs of (96) [every city].....  
 .....Megiddo: 340 living captives, 83 hands, 2,041 mares, 191 female colts, 6 stallions, .....male colts, 1 chariot worked with gold, its [pole] of gold, belonging to that foe; [one] beautiful chariot wrought with gold belonging to the chief of (97) [Megiddo.].....

Urk. 664 .....892 chariots of his wretched army: total 924. 1 beautiful bronze suit of armor of that foe; one beautiful bronze suit of armor of the chief of Megiddo; 200.....suits of armor of his wretched army, 502 bows, 7 poles of *mery*-wood wrought with silver of the tent of that foe.

Now the army [of his Majesty] seized (98).....  
 .....387....., 1,929 cattle, 2,000 small cattle, 20,500 small white cattle.

Apparently no effort was made to take the city by storm. Just why Thutmose did not make such an attempt at once is hard to surmise. We know from the results of the excavations at Megiddo that the place was strongly fortified, but brick walls, even of the strongest, were no deterrent to the king on his later campaigns when he breached the walls of Kadesh, a much more formidable fortress than Megiddo.<sup>92</sup> It is possible that he realized what was apparently the real situation in the city, namely, that no preparation had been made to resist a long siege, and he may therefore have decided to let hunger fight for him, rather than risk the chance of a repulse if he attempted to take the place by storm. He therefore issued the necessary orders and the preparations for the siege began.

The details of the methods pursued by the Egyptians in the siege are, like the details of the battle, very obscure. The Annals state that "they measured this city, inclosing it with an earthwork, fenced about with the green wood of all their pleasant trees, while his Majesty himself was upon the fortress east of the city, watching [upon it day and night.]

92. Breasted, *Ancient Records*, II, 590.

.....inclosed.....with a thick wall.....with its thick wall. Its name was called, 'Menkheperre-is-the-ensnarer-of-the-Asiaties'. It was not permitted that one of them go out to the outside upon the back of this wall except to go out to knock at the door of their inclosure." In the account of the feasts and offerings instituted by the king on his return from this campaign, Thutmose says that he made these offerings "when my Majesty returned from the land of Retenu on the occasion of the first victories which my father Amon gave to me in his giving to me every land of Zahi, assembled and shut up in one city, \* \* \* \* \* I ensnared them in one city. I built upon them with a thick wall to.....of the breath of life, by the favor of my father Amon."<sup>93</sup> Another fragment containing an account of the first campaign preserves the meagre statement: "Majesty surrounded it with a wall, made thick.....Not did they breathe the breath of life, being surrounded in front of their wall."<sup>94</sup>

Before making any suggestions in regard to the method pursued by the Egyptians in constructing this wall, I should like to quote a passage from Thucydides' account of the siege of Platæa by the Peloponnesians. The narrative runs;

"In the first place the soldiers felled the fruit-trees and surrounded the city with a stockade, that henceforth no one might get out. They then began to raise a mound against it, thinking that with so large an army at work this would be the speediest way of taking the place. So they cut timber from Cythæron and built on either side of the intended mound a frame of logs placed crosswise in order that the material might not scatter. Thither they carried wood, stones, earth and anything which would fill up the vacant space. \* \* \* \* \* The Peloponnesians, having failed in this, as in their former attempt, surrounded Platæa with a wall. Trenches out of which they took clay for the bricks were formed both on the inner and outer side of the wall."<sup>95</sup>

Taking this passage from Thucydides in conjunction with the account in the Annals it would seem most likely that Thutmose first marked out, or "measured", a line of circumvallation along which earthworks were to be thrown up. It is possible that the timbers used in "fencing-in" the city were employed, as at Platæa, to strengthen the earthworks, forming a sort of framework in which to pack the earth and stones. The

93. Breasted, *op. cit.* 616.

94. Breasted, *op. cit.* 440.

95. Thucydides (Jowett's translation), II, 75-78.



trees<sup>97</sup> may, on the other hand, have been used, as Maspero suggests,<sup>97</sup> to form a sort of stockade or palisade, which could be easily and quickly erected to assist in shutting up the city until the heavier rampart of earth could be thrown up. Earthworks about two miles long would effectively inclose the Tell. At least one tower or bastion was raised upon the wall, though it is not at all unlikely that such towers were located at intervals along the entire line of siegeworks. The one tower mentioned in the Annals stood on the east of the city. Here the king made his headquarters, directing the troops from this advantageous position where the widest outlook over the operations could be secured.

This method of conducting a siege by walling in a town was in use throughout antiquity. An interesting parallel is recorded on the north-Syrian stela of Zakir, king of Hamath, dating from the eighth century B. C.<sup>98</sup> Zakir relates how Bar-Hadad, son of Hazaël, king of Aram, assembled seven kings against him:

“All these kings erected entrenchments against H<sub>az</sub>[rak.] They threw up a wall higher than the wall of H<sub>az</sub>rak and excavated a moat deeper than [its moat.]”

The rampart that Thutmose erected around Megiddo could hardly have been as high as the walls of the city except on the south, owing to the fact that the city stood on a natural elevation from the base of which the land slopes away on the west, north and east. Moreover, as the Egyptians do not seem to have done more than starve the city into submission, it was not necessary to raise the ramparts high enough to overlook the city.

The sources omit all mention of any encounter between the Egyptians and the Asiatics during the siege. That such conflicts occurred we may feel certain, and in the biography of Amenemheb we have a suggestion of the many stirring events, the details of the story that the Annals give only in outline. As the siege progressed, the supplies in the city ran short.

96. To-day the region around the Tell is utterly destitute of trees. In Thutmose's day, however, it was probably heavily wooded. On the south side of the Carmel Ridge are still the remains of the great forest for which this region was once famous (Josephus, *Wars*, XIII, 2. Strabo, XVI, 26). Possibly this forest extended over to the Esdraelon side of the Ridge and afforded Thutmose the trees needed for his siege-works. However, the term “pleasant (lit. sweet) trees” used in the Annals would seem to refer rather to fruit trees, such as the olive, than to ordinary forest timber. In the Middle Ages there were many fine gardens in and about the plain and the same may have been true even at this early date. The Papyrus Anastasi I, referred to earlier, would also indicate that the district was well wooded.

97. Maspero, *Struggle of the Nations*, p. 258.

98. Pognon, *Inscriptions Sémitiques*, p. 173.

Megiddo was well supplied with water, to be sure, from 'Ain el-Ḳubbi at the northern base of the Tell. Schumacher has demonstrated that this spring is an artificial source, the water being brought down in an underground channel from 'Ain es-Sitt.<sup>99</sup> It is also highly probable that there existed some connection with this channel within the city itself as the excavations at other Palestinian sites have shown to have been customary. It was lack of food rather than of water that probably caused the surrender of the city. The Annals state that the Egyptians did not allow any of the Asiatics to "go out to the outside upon the back of this wall except to go out to knock (?) at the door of their inclosure." This statement can only mean that none of the inhabitants of Megiddo were allowed to leave the city unless they came out to surrender to the Egyptians. In this way the siege continued until famine, most probably, forced the inhabitants to surrender.

The siege had begun on May 15th. The next date in the campaign that we are able to fix is not later than October 11th, at which time Thutmose was in Thebes celebrating a feast of victory. In the interval occurred the siege, a march to southern Lebanon where three cities were captured and a fortress of some kind was constructed, and the return to Egypt. The operations subsequent to the fall of Megiddo could not well have been carried out in less than three months and probably consumed even more time. If, as seems evident, Megiddo was unprepared for a siege, a month would be ample for the interval between the commencement of the work on the inclosing rampart and the surrender of the place. But this again, like so much connected with the battle, is at best conjecture.

The fall of the city carried with it the submission of the other towns and villages in the region around Megiddo. Being the most commanding fortress between Jezreel and the coast, it must have exercised control over an extensive territory, the inhabitants of which naturally looked to Megiddo as their protector and their place of refuge in time of danger. It is not at all unlikely that the leisurely march of the Egyptians from Gaza to Yehem had seen the submission of many of the towns and strongholds in the south. If they had joined in the revolt the decision of the Allies to make their stand at Megiddo must have left the state

99. Schumacher, *Tell el-Mutesellim*, I, p. 160.


to the south defenceless before the Egyptian advance. With the fall of Megiddo the towns in northern Palestine would undoubtedly have seen the uselessness of further resistance and would have hastened to make their submission. The Annals tell us that "the chiefs of the country were coming upon their bellies to kiss the earth because of the might of his Majesty, to crave breath for their nostrils, because great was his power and because great was the might of Amon over every country. All the chiefs were brought because of the might of his Majesty, bearing their tribute."

The importance of the fall of Megiddo cannot be overestimated. It crushed once for all the rebellion in the south. In the subsequent campaigns we have no reference to any serious trouble south of the district of Nuges and the southern Lebanon. This overwhelming defeat of the Allies just at the beginning of their rebellion served largely to break up the alliance, and the later campaigns of Thutmose were almost entirely against a succession of isolated powers. Only in the extreme north, in Naharin and the Orontes valley, was any united effort made to stem the tide of Egyptian advance. A coalition of all Syria-Palestine was made impossible by the crushing blow that the Allies had received at the very beginning of the movement. It gave the Pharaoh the prestige gained from success in the initial battle of the war, and to a great extent paved the way for his subsequent victories in the north. Since the fall of Sharuhem, after a three years' siege by Ahmose I a century earlier, it was the most important single step towards the final conquest of the country by Egypt. It was a fitting introduction to the wars of the greatest conqueror the world had then seen. That it made a lasting impression on the people of the time is evident from the many references to the battle as well as from the fact that the Annals devote almost as much space to this first campaign as to all the succeeding ones put together. It is the first battle in history in which we can in any measure study the disposition of troops and as such forms the starting point for the history of military science.





View I.—Looking up the Wady Arah toward the northeast




View II.—The Wady Arah in the region of Ain Arah




VIEW III.—Looking southwest along the Aruna Road from a point about a mile above the northern opening of the valley.




VIEW IV.—Looking southwest along the Aruna Road about a quarter of a mile above the northern opening of the valley.




VIEW V.—Looking from the opening of the Aruna Road toward Megiddo and the Plain of Esdraelon. (For View VI see Frontispiece)



VIEW VII.—Level land between the opening of the Aruna Road and the Brook Kina, showing probable site of the Egyptian Camp. Looking south from Mound H.



VIEW IX.—The low hills to the west of Megiddo, showing the rocky slopes. Looking west from the Tell. (For Views X and XI see next page)




VIEW XIII.—Looking north showing, on the right, the gradual rise of the land toward the Mounds G and H





VIEW X.—Wady es-Sitt



VIEW XI.—The Wady of the Kina, showing the deep trench the brook has cut across the plain.



VIEW XII.—Profile of east slope of Tell el-Mutesellim where Megiddo stood

Sea

Mediterranean



Number  
feet





Map I

1871






SCALE IN MILES  
1:50,000

1871  
1872





One Half Mile

Numerals indicate height in meters above sea level.










EXPLANATION

K

Scale 1:100,000








1871

Physiology





Egyptians  
Asiatics

One Quarter of  
a Mile

A

Megiddo

Plain of

ASIATIC  
CAMP

Esdraelon

B

G

H

I

Brook

Kishon

C

Hill South  
of Kina

D

E

K









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